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It has been observed that sooner or later most of those who are inter-
ested in the law of torts turn their attention explicitly to the subject of
causation.' Unfortunately, all too often examination of causation is not
accompanied by analysis of its companion concept of "valuation," the pro-
cess of identifying and assessing the value of the interest destroyed.2 Even
when valuation is considered with causation, understanding often is inhib-
ited by a tendency to commingle the concepts. Nowhere are these analyti-
cal shortcomings more harshly manifested nor is there more need of rea-
soned rectification than in the contexts of personal injuries involving
victims suffering from preexisting conditions and of claims for future con-
sequences of an injury.
Causation refers to the cause and effect relationship that must be estab-
lished between tortious conduct and a loss before liability for that loss may
be imposed.' Causation questions relate to the fact of a loss or of its
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1. Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
CII. L. REV. 69, 69 (1975).
2. There are two interrelated functions that are served by the causation and valuation processes.
First, the rules may satisfy a perception of what fundamental considerations of justice require. In this
sense, the requirement of causation seems to fulfill a basic sense of symmetry in the ordering of
human affairs. Redress for losses "caused" seems to return the scales to equipoise. By performing this
function, causation and valuation may enhance respect for the legal system and the rule of law.
The second role of causation and valuation is to contribute to an optimal allocation of resources.
Rules of causation and valuation determine when a particular loss will be assigned to a specific indi-
vidual or entity. This loss-assigning function helps assure that consumers are informed of the "real"
costs of the many products, services, and activities that may cause accidental injuries, and also ani-
mates the deterrent, incentive, and loss-distributing goals of tort law. The fundamental rationale of
enterprise liability-that the cost of accidents caused by an enterprise should be charged to the enter-
prise as a cost of doing business-is effectuated by the concepts of causation and valuation. See gener-
ally Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976). Society's
resources will be more likely to be allocated optimally if consumers can weigh true costs.
3. For a general discussion of the cause-in-fact requirement in tort law, see A. BECHT & F.
MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION (1961), F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §
20.2 (1956 & Supp. 1968), H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 103-229 (1959), and W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-45 (4th ed. 1971).
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source. Valuation is the process of identifying and measuring the loss that
was caused by the tortious conduct. Although these concepts serve similar
goals, they are different. An appreciation of this difference is a first step
in dealing rationally with problems of preexisting conditions and future
consequences in tort cases.
Under a tort system of accident compensation, individualized recoveries
are awarded in an effort to make whole each particular plaintiff. In such
a compensation system, preexisting conditions are unavoidable realities
that must enter into the valuation-damages calculus. Every victim of tor-
tious conduct inevitably brings to the transaction a tangle of preexisting
conditions. These conditions may already have produced or preordained
part or all of the harm for which the plaintiff s~eks redress. The courts
face the increasingly difficult tasks of sorting out the various preexisting
conditions and tortious acts that may affect the value of a particular inter-
est, and of allocating responsibility among them. Assessment of damages is
further complicated by the fact that the value of an interest may depend
significantly upon future expectancies of gain and health, with damages in
turn depending on the extent to which a tortious injury affects those
expectancies.
The response of the courts to questions of causation and valuation in-
volving preexisting conditions and claims for future consequences has been
largely unsatisfactory. Their failure to distinguish between the functions
of causation and valuation, or to identify and value rationally the true
interests lost, has created a serious gap in the remedial structure. Courts
have had difficulty perceiving that a chance of avoiding some adverse re-
sult or of achieving some favorable result is a compensable interest in its
own right. In some respects the notion of chance has been subsumed into
the final result. When this occurs, the loss of a chance of avoiding some
adverse result or achieving some favorable result either is completely re-
dressed or is denied, depending on the likelihood, destroyed by the defen-
dant's tortious conduct, of avoiding or achieving the particular result.
It is the thesis of this article that the loss of a chance of achieving a
favorable outcome or of avoiding an adverse consequence should be com-
pensable and should be valued appropriately, rather than treated as an
all-or-nothing proposition. Preexisting conditions must, of course, be
taken into account in valuing the interest destroyed. When those preexist-
ing conditions have not absolutely preordained an adverse outcome, how-
ever, the chance of avoiding it should be appropriately compensated even
if that chance is not better than even.
This article begins by attempting to create a rational analytic frame-
work within which questions of preexisting conditions and damages for
future consequences can be addressed and resolved. Part I attempts to elu-
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cidate the distinction between the causation and valuation inquiries and to
develop a workable definition of preexisting conditions. Part II examines
the ways in which the courts have traditionally dealt with the problem of
preexisting conditions, future consequences, and loss of a chance in per-
sonal injury cases. Finally, the article proposes a more consistent and ra-
tional approach to the loss of a chance in personal injury law and suggests
a method of valuing chance.
I. Distinguishing Matters of Causation and Valuation
It is not uncommon for courts to apply the concept of causation to mat-
ters of valuation as well as causation. This melding of concepts is more
than a matter of style or nomenclature; it has often affected the ways
courts deal with preexisting conditions and future consequences. There-
fore, in a careful analysis of the problem of preexisting conditions and
future consequences, the notions of causation and valuation must be
distinguished.'
A. The Nature of Causation in Tort Law
Proof that a defendant engaged in tortious conduct will not alone
render him civilly liable. The other elements of a valid cause of action
must be established,6 and one of these elements is causation.7 While a
defendant's conduct need not be and indeed never could be the sole cause
of the injury, it must at least have been a cause of the loss claimed.
The traditional test of causation is the "but for" or "sine qua non"
test.' Under this test, causation exists when the injury would not have
occurred "but for" the defendant's tortious conduct. In recent years, due to
the influence of the late Dean Prosser and the Restatements of Torts, the
4. A number of these matters were addressed in an earlier work in a fairly specific factual context.
see J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL 196-204 (1977). The proposal
there that the loss of a chance be included in determining the extent of a tortfeasor's liability is
reexplored and extensively elaborated upon here.
5. Articulation of the difference between causation and valuation has been attempted by a number
of commentators. See, e.g., A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 3, at 123-30; W. PROSSER, supra note
3, § 52, at 321-22; Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 80-81 (1956).
6. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 30 (discussing elements of cause of action for negligence). The
elements of different torts tend to vary with the particular tort involved, but causation is a universal
element. Id. § 41, at 236.
7. Id. Causation (or cause in fact) is a very different concept from that of "proximate cause."
Causation refers to the cause and effect relationship between the tortious conduct and the injury. The
doctrine of proximate cause encompasses the whole panoply of rules that may deny liability for other-
wise actionable causes of harm. See generally R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS
(1963); W. PROSSER, supra note 3, §§ 41-45.
8. See, e.g., Polyard v. Terry, 160 N.J. Super. 497, 510-12, 390 A.2d 653, 660-61 (1978), affd per
curiam, 79 N.J. 547, 401 A.2d 532 (1979); Schenck v. Roger Williams Gen. Hosp., 382 A.2d 514,
516-17 (R.I. 1977). See generally A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 3, at 13-21; H. HART & A.
HONORE, supra note 3, at 103-22.
1355
The Yale Law Journal
"substantial factor" test has been advocated as a replacement for the but-
for test.' A force or condition is deemed a cause of a victim's harm when it
was a "substantial factor" in bringing that result about."0 The substantial
factor test retains but-for causation as an essential precondition" except in
situations in which two or more actively operating forces, for only one of
which the defendant was responsible, combine to bring about the harm,
and each alone would have been sufficient to bring about the harm.
12
The causation inquiry has traditionally had an all-or-nothing effect on
the outcome of a tort claim. Unless a causal connection is established
under the applicable standard of proof (usually requiring that it appear
more likely than not), the plaintiff will receive nothing for the loss in
question."
B. Valuation and the Nature of Preexisting Conditions
Valuation is animated by a premise similar to that underlying causa-
tion: that a tortfeasor should be charged only with the value of the interest
he destroyed. In determining what that value is, the preinjury condition of
the victim should be taken into account. Valuation therefore requires that
there be a workable definition of preexisting conditions-those conditions
that should be considered in assessing the value of the interest destroyed.
There are always forces and conditions other than the defendant's con-
duct that must be considered in valuing an interest. Some of these forces
will constitute contributing causes of the injury, some will constitute pre-
existing conditions, and some will constitute both preexisting conditions
and contributing causes.
In some situations, another force or condition will constitute a contrib-
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-433 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 41, at
239-41. The substantial factor rule is expressly adopted and articulated in the contexts of negligence,
intentional torts, and strict liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431, Comment e (1965).
The most recent part of the Restatement also explicitly adopts the foregoing principles for intentional
torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870, Comment 1 (1979). Other sections of the 1965
part of the Restatement, however, clouded the issue by seeming to suggest a more lenient test of
causation for cases involving intentional or reckless conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433, Comment c (1965); id. § 501(2).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
11. See id. § 432(1).
12. Id. § 432(2). The classic example is that of two fires, one set by the defendant and one of
other origin, that converge before destroying the plaintiff's property and causing personal injury, and
either one of which would have been sufficient to do the harm. Id. (illustration 3). In one sense, the
but-for ingredient is not completely dispensed with even in this situation. It must still appear that in
the absence of the other actively operating forces, the harm would not have occurred but for the
defendant's tortious conduct. For further analysis of the substantial factor test, see p. 1360 & note 26
infra.
13. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B & Comment a (1965). For a rare in-
stance of a departure from the all-or-nothing approach to causation, see Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Reptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980) (dis-
cussed in note 116 infra).
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uting cause of the injury, but not a preexisting condition. That some other
force is a contributing cause does not necessarily prevent the defendant's
conduct from being a cause.' 4 One can imagine numerous examples of
multiple contributing causes of an injury. Assume that a physician negli-
gently prescribes a medication in a dose that is obviously excessive. There-
after, a nurse administers the drug without seeking confirmation or other-
wise questioning the dosage level. The conduct of both would be
contributing causes of the injury. The doctor's negligence is not a preexist-
ing condition.
Generally, a preexisting condition may be defined as a disease, condi-
tion, or force that has become sufficiently associated with the victim to be
factored into the value of the interest destroyed, and that has become so
before the defendant's conduct has reached a similar stage." A threatening
force or condition should qualify when it has "attached"-that is, its asso-
ciation with the value of the interest in question could not be avoided even
if the victim were aware of its existence-and has attached before the
defendant's conduct has reached a similar stage. Such conditions and
forces should ordinarily be taken into account in determining the value of
the interest lost.
This definition can be illustrated by the case of Dillon v. Twin State
Gas & Electric Co.6 A youth lost his balance and started to fall from a
bridge, but before he was completely off the bridge, he came into contact
with the defendant's high tension wires and was electrocuted. The electri-
cal charge threw the youth back onto the bridge and therefore it could not
be known whether he could have regained his balance had he not been
electrocuted. The plaintiff sued the electric company for negligence in not
insulating the charged accessible wires. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court correctly held that although the electrical current "caused" the
death regardless of the fall, the fact that the victim had lost his balance
and had started to fall should be taken into account in assessing the extent
of the defendant's liability.' 7 Damages would therefore depend in part on
the victim's prospects of either regaining his balance or surviving the fall
prior to being electrocuted.' 8 At the time of the electrocution the fall was
14. In this connection, the Restatement states:
In order that a negligent actor may be liable for harm resulting to another from his conduct, it
is only necessary that it be a legal cause of the harm. It is not necessary that it be the cause,
using the word 'the' as meaning the sole and even the predominant cause.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430, Comment d (1965).
15. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 52, at 321-22.
16. 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 (1932).
17. Id. at 456-57, 163 A. at 114-15.
18. The Dillon court correctly understood when a force should be deemed a preexisting condition,
but it (like most courts), by adopting an all-or-nothing approach to chance in the context presented,
misperceived the appropriate way of taking preexisting conditions into account for valuation purposes.
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already in progress. It had attached, and at least its onset could not have
been averted. Perhaps the youth could have regained his balance; perhaps
he could not. But the beginning of the fall-the loss of balance and result-
ing loss of physical support-was an accomplished fact, and thus a preex-
isting condition.
Consider another example. Assume that the decedent was negligently
killed as he was about to board the Titanic. Under the proposed test, the
fact that an iceberg was growing in the North Atlantic and was appar-
ently destined to sink the ship would not be a preexisting condition to be
considered in assessing the value of the decedent's life. Although the grow-
ing iceberg was a threatening force, it was an avoidable one if, under the
proposed definition, one assumes prescience. Some commentators who
have considered the "doomed steamer" example have found, on a more
visceral level, that the threat to the ship was simply too remote and con-
tingent to be introduced into the interest-loss valuation. 9 The retrospec-
tive conjuring up of events contingent at the time of injury would open the
door to absurd results. Allowing such contingencies to affect valuation
would create a rule that could not be administered. The proposed defini-
tion affords an appropriate and predictable selection mechanism for iden-
tifying preexisting conditions.
A condition or force also may operate as a contributing cause of an
injury in one respect and as a preexisting condition in another. A doctor
may, for example, negligently fail to diagnose a preexisting disease, al-
lowing it to progress, with harmful effects. The disease was obviously a
cause of the harm. The doctor's negligence in allowing the disease to pro-
gress may also have caused harm. In assessing the value of that loss, the
disease should be deemed a preexisting condition and be taken into
account.
Whether a force or condition should be deemed a contributing cause, a
preexisting condition, or in some respects both can be a difficult question.
Perhaps the simplest way to address the problem is to inquire initially
whether a force or condition should be treated as a preexisting condition.
19. Prosser seems to have opted for this visceral approach, stating that "if such factors as these are
to be considered as reducing value, they must be in operation when the defendant causes harm, and so
imminent that reasonable men would take them into account." W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 52, at 321
(emphasis added). Justice Peaslee, who first invoked the "doomed steamship" example, observed that
the reasons for not finding a preexisting condition were "more readily felt than stated." Peaslee,
Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1140 (1934). Peaslee would also judge value
by "known portents" and disregard unsuspected future events. Id. This approach differs from the test
proposed in the text, which would weigh future threats, including unknown ones, as long as they had
in fact "attached"-that is, become unavoidable-at the time of injury. While the proposed test and
Peaslee's test would reach the same result in the Titanic case, they would reach different results in
other situations. In those instances, the proposed test is preferable since it more accurately reflects the
actual status of the affected interest at the time of the injury.
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When a preexisting condition is also a contributing cause, that fact should
ordinarily not prevent the condition from affecting the amount of damages
that the plaintiff receives.
Matters may be complicated when two forces, a preexisting force and
the defendant's tort, actively operate within a short time span to cause or
contribute to some end result that does not appear readily divisible. The
defendant's conduct generally will not have been a cause of the entire
harm, because the effect of the preexisting force almost always will have
reduced the value of the interest that the defendant destroyed. Some
courts, failing to distinguish between the two ideas, have held that because
the result does not appear readily divisible, the harm is incapable of ap-
portionment as a matter of law, and have held the defendants jointly and
severally liable for the entire harm suffered.20 If both of two forces are
causes of the entire harm (so that neither is a preexisting condition) and
there is therefore no reasonable causal basis for apportioning the harm,
joint and several liability for the entire harm may be appropriate. 21 Even
when another force is a preexisting condition and the defendant's tort is
therefore not a cause of the entire harm, it may sometimes be appropriate
to require the defendant to prove how damages should be apportioned, or
be liable to the plaintiff for the entire harm.22 Holding the defendant lia-
ble for the entire harm without any consideration of the preexisting condi-
tion, however, is with one exception 2 unsound.24 Even when a preexisting
20. E.g., Wilson v. Swinford, 324 So. 2d 582, 585 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Chrysler Corp. v. Todo-
rovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1130-31 (Wyo. 1978); see note 25 infra (criticizing Todorovich).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, Comment i (1965). Under the traditional
view, a tortfeasor may be jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the entire harm that hi caused
even if the acts of others may also have been causes of the same harm. See American Motorcycle Ass'n
v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 587, 578 P.2d 899, 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 187 (1978); W.
PROSSER, supra note 3, § 47, at 297. The tortfeasor may, however, have a right to seek contribution or
indemnity from others who were tortiously liable to the plaintiff for the same harm. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 886A, 886B (1979).
22. See pp. 1390-94 infra.
23. See p. 1362 infra (discussing the subsuming injury problem).
24. The Restatement position, although ambiguous, is probably consistent with this conclusion.
Apart from the effects of shifting the burden of proof, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433B(2) (1965), the Restatement would impose liability on a defendant for the entire harm when each
force (including the defendant's) was a cause of the harm and the harm could not be apportioned
reasonably. See id. § 433A & Comment i. To the extent that another force was a preexisting condi-
tion, the defendant's conduct may not have been a cause of the harm, but only a part of it, and
reasonable apportionment would not be impossible. Indeed, the Comments acknowledge that appor-
tionment reflecting preexisting conditions may be appropriate, even when the end result appears indi-
visible. See id. § 433A, Comment c.
Other Restatement sections, while confusing, seem to represent a partial melding of sections 433A
and 433B(2) with respect to preexisting conditions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 879 &
Comment b (1979) (each tortfeasor liable for entire harm when each of two or more tortfeasors was
"a legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned," but rule not applicable when each causes a
distinct harm or one person aggravates harm caused by another, except presumably for effect of possi-
bly shifting burden of proof). For further elaboration of the Restatement position with respect to
contributing tortfeasors, see id. §§ 875, 881.
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condition and the defendant's tort may both have been but-for 2 or sub-
stantial-factor26 causes of a specific end result, the loss caused by the de-
fendant may not be the entire loss because the preexisting condition re-
duced the value of the interest the defendant destroyed.
The defendant should be subject to liability only to the extent that he
tortiously contributed to the harm by allowing a preexisting condition to
progress or by aggravating or accelerating its harmful effects, or to the
extent that he otherwise caused harm in excess of that attributable soley to
preexisting conditions. 27 The effect of preexisting conditions should de-
pend on the extent to which such conditions affect the present and future
value of the interest lost. The practical effect of preexisting conditions on
damages, however, may be significantly affected by the placement of the
burden of proof.
28
The rule that a victim's preexisting condition should ordinarily be
25. See, e.g., Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 (1932) (discussed
at pp. 1357-58 supra). A fall caused the victim to grasp the electric wire that killed him. The fall was
thus a cause of his electrocution, as were the defendant's wires. The court held that the fall was a
preexisting condition that had to be taken into account in assessing damages.
This problem is well illustrated in the "crashworthiness" cases of the products liability field. In
these cases, the occurrence of the accident or "crash" had already placed the victim in jeopardy when
the other factor-the allegedly defective condition that enhanced the injury or failed adequately to
safeguard the victim from the effects of the crash-came into play. Under these circumstances the
crash, and its potential consequences even without the defective condition, should be deemed a preex-
isting condition that should be taken into account in assessing the defendant's liability. See, e.g., Hud-
dell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-39 (3d Cir. 1976). Some courts impose joint and several liability on
the defendant manufacturer when they perceive the end result to be indivisible. See Chrysler Corp. v.
Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1130-31 (Wyo. 1978). This approach misses the point. Although the end
result may be indivisible, the harm or loss attributable to the defendant's conduct may have been less
than the total loss suffered, and therefore apportionable. An argument can be made in such cases that
the defendant should have the burden of proving the extent to which the preexisting crash reduced the
value of the interest destroyed. See generally pp. 1390-94 (Part II-D) infra (discussing burden of
proof). Subjecting the defendant to liability for the entire harm suffered, however, without allowing
him an opportunity to prove the effects of the preexisting condition, is tantamount to disregarding the
preexisting condition. Moreover, the adoption of the method of valuing chance proposed in this article
would make apportionment more feasible. See pp. 1376-81 infra. See generally note 135 infra (dis-
cussing possible rights to contribution or indemnity).
26. One of two substantial-factor causes (in the section 432(2) sense) of the same end result could
still be deemed a preexisting condition. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2)
(1965) (discussing substantial-factor exception to but-for rule). Consider a patient who has been given
a dose of medication that a few minutes later causes shock, while at the same time hemorrhage from
negligently performed surgery also induces shock. Assume that the patient dies of the combined shock
and that the shock produced by either event alone would have been fatal. Each event could be deemed
a substantial factor in producing the patient's death. Yet because the drug had been administered (had
attached) prior to the surgical error, a strong argument can be made that the presence of the drug
should be deemed a preexisting condition and taken into account in deciding what interest (including
the chance of a more favorable outcome), if any, was destroyed by the defendant, and in determining
the interest's value. For an apparently contrary view, see Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417,
428-30 (2d Cir. 1969).
27. See, e.g., Stephens v. Koch, 192 Colo. 531, 533-34, 561 P.2d 333, 334 (1977); DeFelice v.
Barberino Rental Corp., 157 Conn. 231, 234-35, 253 A.2d 37, 39 (1968); Valliere v. Filfalt, 110
N.H. 331, 332-33, 266 A.2d 843, 844-45 (1970); Potts v. Howser, 274 N.C. 49, 54, 161 S.E.2d 737,
741-42 (1968).
28. See pp. 1390-94 infra.
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taken into account in assessing damages is in no way inconsistent with the
time-honored doctrine that the defendant takes his victim as he finds
him.29 Under this rule, sometimes referred to as the "thin skull" doctrine,
the fact that the harm suffered by the victim exceeds the harm that one
would reasonably have expected a normal person to suffer does not defeat
liability or prevent the defendant's conduct from being a cause of the in-
jury. The "take him as you find him" rule does not, however, make the
victim's preaccident condition irrelevant." The preexisting condition of the
victim should be considered in assessing the value of the interest destroyed
or affected. That a terminally ill victim would have died on Tuesday, the
next day, does not prevent the defendant's conduct from being a cause of
his death on Monday, but would obviously be quite relevant to the ques-
tion of damages. In essence, the "take him as you find him" rule simply
means that the extent of the victim's actual injury from the accident need
not have been reasonably foreseeable.
Although preexisting conditions generally should be taken into account
in valuing the interest destroyed, a compelling argument can be made that
the rule should be qualified when that condition is caused by tortious con-
duct and is followed by an injury not causally related to the prior injury,
and the second injury subsumes and to some extent preempts the first.
The first tortfeasor, A, might inflict an injury that results in complete
29. See note 30 infra (citing cases). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461
(1965).
30. This distinction is articulated in numerous cases. See, e.g., Irving v. Bullock, 549 P.2d 1184,
1187 (Alaska 1976); Schore v. Mueller, 290 Minn. 186, 189, 186 N.W.2d 699, 701 (1971). Thus, in the
Schore case, the court noted:
[A] person who has a preexisting disability is entitled to recover damages for an aggravation of
that condition even though the particular consequences would not have followed absent his
prior disability, recovery being limited, however, to the additional injury over and above the
consequences which normally would have followed from the preexisting condition absent de-
fendant's negligence.
Id. at 189, 186 N.W.2d at 701. In the leading case of McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y.
221, 223-24, 94 N.E. 616, 617 (1911), the fact that the auto accident victim, who was an alcoholic,
suffered more severe consequences than a healthy person would have experienced did not defeat liabil-
ity or mean that the defendant did not "cause" the injury. The victim's preexisting condition, how-
ever, was expressly held by the court to be a factor to be taken into account in assessing damages. Id.
at 224, 94 N.E. at 617.
Occasionally a court will fail to distinguish the two ideas. In Foster v. Baptist Mem. Hosp., 506
S.W.2d 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974), the court began quite correctly with the general rule that the "tort
feasor must accept the injured person as he finds him." Id. at 778. The court also correctly implied
that the defendant would not be liable for medical expenses, loss of earnings, or pain and suffering
experienced prior to the injury the defendant caused. Id. at 779. Unfortunately, the court went on to
hold: "If the wrongful act results in the aggravation of, or an increase in, a permanent partial disabil-
ity existing in the injured party, then it matters not to what extent the wrongful act aggravates or
increases that disability; any increase thereof renders the tort feasor liable for all." Id. at 778 (empha-
sis added). Fortunately, the unsound portion of Foster appears not to have been followed. See Fuller
v. Speight, 571 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) ("The fact that a party is in a weakened
condition at the time of the injury is not a causal defense available to the defendant . . . . Such
condition may be material to the issue of [damages] .... ") (emphasis added); Haws v. Bullock, 592
S.W.2d 588, 590-91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (explaining Foster result on other grounds).
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paralysis of the plaintiff's right arm. One year later, but before a final
decision on damages in the plaintiff's claim against A, a second tortfeasor,
the defendant B, might inflict another injury to the arm, requiring its
amputation. A would assert, under what is perhaps the traditional view,
that when a subsuming injury for which he bore no legal responsibility
occurs prior to such a decision, he should be liable only for the actual
accrued losses that materialized prior to the subsuming second injury. 1 B,
on the other hand, would assert that he should be liable only for the value
of the interest that he destroyed-the value of a paralyzed right arm plus
any collateral damages attributable to the second injury or the amputa-
tion. Such a result is difficult to justify. That there were two tortfeasors
would actually reduce the damages substantially below what they would
have been for either injury alone."
This anomaly can be rectified in several ways. One solution would be to
calculate the amount of A's liability at the time of the initial injury with-
out regard to subsequent events. A more reasonable solution entails
reevaluating the nature of the loss caused by B. Not only has the defen-
dant B's tortious conduct necessitated the amputation of the plaintiff's
arm, it may also have foreclosed much of the plaintiff's potential recovery
from A, the prior tortfeasor. Extrapolating from the "take him as you find
him" concept, it can be argued that one of the risks with which the defen-
dant takes his plaintiff is the risk that the injury inflicted by the defendant
might subsume a prior unredressed injury by another tortfeasor, and
thereby foreclose the plaintiff from receiving -full compensation from the
first tortfeasor. Thus B should be held liable not only for the additional
harm he caused, but also for the extent to which recourse against A for
actual losses subsequent to the second injury was prevented by the second
tort, and such losses were not otherwise recoverable from B. This ap-
proach can be reconciled with the general rule that the value of a lost
31. See, e.g., Tucker v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 356 F. Supp. 709, 710-12 (D. Md. 1973); Jurney v.
Lubeznik, 72 111. App. 2d 117, 132, 218 N.E.2d 799, 806 (1966); Victorson v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transp. Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 336, 361, 234 N.W.2d 332, 344 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 910, Comment b (1979); id. § 924, Comment e; id. § 926(a) & Comment a. But see Buchal-
ski v. Universal Marine Corp., 393 F. Supp. 246, 249-52 (W.D. Wash. 1975). Although the foregoing
authorities that support the rule addressed the problem of subsuming injuries in general, it is assumed
for the purposes of the present discussion that their analysis would also apply in the context of sub-
suming tortious injuries as well. Buchalski, which rejected the rule generally, contains dicta similarly
rejecting it in that context. Id. at 250-51. For a possible limitation to the rule, see notes 32 and 135
infra.
The first tortfeasor would rely on an extension of the general rule that damages are determined in
light of all the evidence presented at trial concerning the harm that has resulted or probably will
result from the tortious conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910, Comment b (1979).
32. The foregoing analysis assumes that the harm was reasonably capable of apportionment be-
tween the two torts. Were this not so, a different result might follow if the burden of proving appor-
tionment were shifted to either or both tortfeasors. See note 135 infra. See generally pp. 1390-94
infra.
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interest should reflect any preexisting conditions. Although on the one
hand the plaintiff's preexisting condition would reduce the value of the
lost interest, that value would be augmented by the value of the plaintiff's
potential claim against A for actual subsequent losses, which he lost due
to defendant B's tort.
A more complex case may arise when the conduct of A, the first
tortfeasor, while threatening the victim with harm, has not yet actually
inflicted harm at the time of the second injury. It is at least conceivable
that the effect of A's conduct might be cognizable as a preexisting condi-
tion and yet not have developed enough at the time of the second injury to
have given rise to a cause of action against A. Again, B, the second
tortfeasor, should be held liable not only for the harm he added, but also
for the damages for actual losses that otherwise would have been recover-
able from A but were preempted by B's conduct. 3
II. Causation and Valuation in the Context of Preexisting Condi-
tions and Future Consequences
Causation has for the most part been treated as an all-or-nothing pro-
position. Either a loss was caused by the defendant or it was not. Inexpli-
cably, the all-or-nothing approach of the causation inquiry has been al-
lowed to slip its analytical moorings, influencing the identification and
valuation of losses in cases involving preexisting conditions and claims for
future consequences. A plaintiff ordinarily should be required to prove by
the applicable standard of proof that the defendant caused the loss in
question. What caused a loss, however, should be a separate question
from what the nature and extent of the loss are. This distinction seems to
have eluded the courts, with the result that lost chances in many respects
are compensated either as certainties or not at all.
To illustrate, consider the case in which a doctor negligently fails to
diagnose a patient's cancerous condition until it has become inoperable.
Assume further that even with a timely diagnosis the patient would have
had only a 30% chance of recovering from the disease and surviving over
the long term. There are two ways of handling such a case. Under the
traditional approach, this loss of a not-better-than-even chance of recover-
ing from the cancer would not be compensable because it did not appear
more likely that not that the patient would have survived with proper
33. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 52, at 322. One commentator would reach a similar result
under a somewhat different analysis. See Peaslee, supra note 19, at 1137-38. Justice Peaslee reasoned
that if "[t]he situation of threatened wrong still leaves the plaintiff possessed of all the values he had
before . . . . [then t]he prospective harm has not impaired that value, because the prospect of an
accrued right to recover the damage from the offender keeps strict pace with that of impending in-
jury." Id. at 1137 (emphasis added).
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care. Recoverable damages, if any, would depend on the extent to which it
appeared that cancer killed the patient sooner than it would have with
timely diagnosis and treatment, and on the extent to which the delay in
diagnosis aggravated the patient's condition, such as by causing additional
pain. A more rational approach, however, would allow recovery for the
loss of the chance of cure even though the chance was not better than
even. The probability of long-term survival would be reflected in the
amount of damages awarded for the loss of the chance. While the plaintiff
here could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was de-
nied a cure by the defendant's negligence, he could show by a preponder-
ance that he was deprived of a 30% chance of a cure.
A. Traditional Rules and Approaches
In analyzing the treatment of chance in tort claims involving preexisting
conditions and future consequences, it is useful to distinguish two types of
losses. The first, which might be called a definitive loss, involves the loss
of a chance either of completely avoiding a specific harm or of achieving a
fairly definitive favorable result. These types of claims include both mate-
rialized losses and anticipated future consequences (including loss of fu-
ture benefits). A plaintiff might assert, for example, that had the decedent
received timely treatment, he would not have died from the disease.
The second type of loss consists of losses that might be called partial or
less definitive losses. These include losses other than the chance of avoid-
ing completely some untoward result or of achieving completely some spe-
cific benefit. They include materialized and future partial losses due to
aggravation or acceleration of the untoward effects of a preexisting condi-
tion, or to acceleration of some adverse preordained result, as well as
claims for future consequences that are less than definitive. Thus, even if
a plaintiff could not recover for the lost chance of being cured of cancer,
he might still be entitled to recover for aggravation of its untoward effects
or acceleration of the moment of death. Regardless of whether preexisting
conditions are involved, a significant portion of partial losses will be in the
form of future consequences. Moreover, the process of proving and esti-
mating damages for both definitive and partial losses may be subject to
much the same analysis as is applied to partial losses, and is addressed in
that section of the article.14 Although the all-or-nothing principle operates
in the context of partial or less definitive losses, including the loss of a
chance of avoiding such losses, it operates less completely. 5 In addition,
claims for more than one type of loss will often be asserted as a result of a
34. See pp. 1373-76 infra.
35. See p. 1374 infra.
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single injury, subject only to the obvious limitation that there should be no
double recovery. Claims for either type of loss may arise from passive
injuries due to omissions (such as failure to diagnose a disease) or from
actively inflicted injuries (such as a surgical incision).
The two basic loss types will be discussed in two of the three sections
that follow." General principles relating to losses attributable to future
consequences from a tortious injury will be discussed briefly in a separate
section." Because, however, such losses may consist of either definitive or
partial losses, discussion of future consequences will largely be integrated
into the sections addressing the two basic loss types.
1. Loss of a Chance of Complete Loss Avoidance
The first type of loss involves the destruction of a: chance of completely
avoiding an adverse result or of achieving a definitive favorable result.
Most courts have misperceived the nature of the interest destroyed by fail-
ing to identify the destroyed chance itself as the compensable loss. Instead,
they have treated the chance of avoiding the loss as if it were either a
certainty or an impossibility, depending on whether, (under the traditional
standard of proof) the tortiously reduced likelihood of loss avoidance was
better than even. Thus, the plaintiff will recover for a lost opportunity
only if it appears more likely than not that but for the tort some definitive
adverse result would have been avoided. His recovery, however, will not
be discounted by the chance that the loss might have occurred even absent
the tort. Conversely, the plaintiff recovers nothing for the lost chance if
the probability of that chance does not rise to the level required by the
applicable standard of proof. 8
The majority of personal injury torts cases that have confronted the
question have adopted an all-or-nothing approach to the loss of a chance. 9
Only a few personal injury cases have recognized, even implicitly, the loss
36. See pp. 1365-70, 1373-76 infra.
37. See pp. 1370-73 infra.
38. The Ohio case of Kuhn v. Banker, 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E.2d 242 (1938), provides an
example of the all-or-nothing rule in the passive injury situation. The plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant-physician negligently failed to discover the disunion of a fracture of her thigh bone that had
initially united after being set. When the disunion was discovered it was too late to attempt another
union. Surgery was necessary, and afterwards the plaintiff remained significantly disabled. Expert
testimony indicated that even if the defendant had made a timely discovery of the disunion, the likeli-
hood of successfully achieving a second union was not better than 35%. The Ohio Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's decision to direct a verdict for the defendant. The standard of proof in Ohio
required that the plaintiff establish that it was probable that a positive outcome would have been
achieved but for the defendant's negligence. The court expressly held that the plaintiff was not enti-
tled to damages for the "loss of a chance of recovery" when the chance of successful recovery was not
better than even. Id. at 310-15, 13 N.E.2d at 244-47.
39. See notes 44-46, 53-55 infra (citing sources).
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of a chance as a compensable interest valued in its own right."
The adoption of the all-or-nothing approach to the loss of a chance has
the obvious effect of enhancing the importance of the standard of proof,
which determines the degree of certainty with which the party with the
burden of proof 1 must satisfy that burden in order to prevail. Perhaps for
this reason, when results under the all-or-nothing rule have appeared too
harsh to courts, attention has generally focused on the standard of proof as
the appropriate doctrine for reformulation. Three different standards of
proof have been applied with respect to the compensability of a lost
chance under the all-or-nothing rule. In order of their onerousness to the
party with the burden of proof, they are the "actual certainty" standard,
the prevailing "more likely than not" standard, and the "reasonable possi-
bility" standard. The problem, however, is not the standard of proof, but
the object to which that standard is applied: the interest for which redress
is sought. Viewing the matter as a standard-of-proof issue has prevented
analysis of the real problem, the all-or-nothing approach to the loss of a
chance. 2
40. See p. 1380 & notes 95-96 infra.
41. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed here that the burden of proof would remain on the
plaintiff. This is not always so, however, nor should it be. See generally pp. 1390-94 infra.
42. Expert testimony is often required in causation-valuation questions. When it is required,
courts usually require that it be expressed in terms that are equivalent to the applicable standard of
proof in order to be sufficient to support a verdict. See, e.g., Davis v. P. Gambardelli & Son Cheese
Corp., 147 Conn. 365, 373, 161 A.2d 583, 587 (1960); Laskowski v. Wallis, 58 Del. 98, 101-02, 205
A.2d 825, 826-27 (1964); Jolicoeur v. Conrad, 106 N.H. 496, 498-99, 213 A.2d 912, 914 (1965);
Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Okla. 1973). Thus, if the traditional "more likely than not"
standard of proof is applicable, the expert is frequently required to testify in those or equivalent
terms. Some courts have even stated that unless the testimony is expressed in such terms, it is inadmis-
sible. See, e.g., Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 58-62, 344 A.2d 422, 425-28 (1975); Scott County
Co-op v. Brown, 187 So. 2d 321, 325-26 (Miss. 1966); O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wash. 2d 814, 822-
25, 440 P.2d 823, 829-30 (1968).
One cannot, however, infer that a court's decision to uphold the admissibility of expert testimony
expressed in terms less probative than the prevailing more-likely-than-not standard, or to uphold the
sufficiency of the evidence in such a case, signifies adoption of a more lenient standard of proof. While
it is possible that the court intended to adopt a more lenient standard, this is rarely the case. There
are other, more likely, explanations of such decisions. First, while adhering to the more-likely-than-
not standard of proof, the court may have found that there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict,
even though testimony from a specific expert was expressed in less probative terms, because testimony
expressed with a higher level of certainty from this expert was not necessary to uphold the verdict.
There may, for example, have been other probative evidence thit was sufficient when taken in con-
junction with this expert's testimony; or there may have been other expert testimony that was suffi-
ciently probative; or the facts may have been cognizable to laymen, and expert testimony therefore
unneeded. Second, the court may have preferred to admit such expert testimony and to reserve deci-
sion on whether, considering all of that party's evidence, there was sufficient showing to submit the
case to the trier of fact. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Mailliard, 175 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa 1970); Gibson
v. Avery, 463 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). Courts are generally more lenient on questions
of admissibility than on questions of sufficiency. On the distinction between relevancy and sufficiency
of evidence, see C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 436
(2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). Third, the court may have found that, despite some language ostensibly
couched in less probative terms, the expert's testimony taken as a whole was sufficiently probative of
the traditional standard of proof. Occasionally, a court may approve expert testimony expressed in less
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The all-or-nothing concept of chance has usually been applied to defini-
tive losses regardless of which standard of proof was adopted. Thus, varia-
tions in the standard of proof may determine upon whom the loss will fall,
but the all-or-nothing nature of that loss is determined by the court's atti-
tude towards the place of chance in the concept of injury.
Of the three different standards of proof, the actual certainty formula-
tion43 is the least prevalent." This is not surprising, since the very idea of
certainty of unknown and future events is implausible.
The second standard of proof, termed the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" rule or the "more likely than not" standard, is the most widely
followed approach not only for causation questions in general, but also
under the all-or-nothing approach to loss of a chance. 4" This rule denies
compensation for the loss of a not-better-than-even chance of avoiding
some adverse result.
An Ohio malpractice case illustrates the operation of the more-likely-
than-not standard of proof in conjunction with the all-or-nothing ap-
probative terms than the applicable standard of proof under the misguided concern that more defini-
tive testimony would invade the province of the jury. Although the old rule was that the expert should
not be permitted to express an opinion on an ultimate factual issue, the majority of courts now permit
an expert opinion on an ultimate fact, at least when it does not express a belief as to how the case
should be decided. Id. § 12, at 26-27.
The preceding observations relate to causation-damages questions in general and are not limited to
the present context.
43. The actual certainty standard of proof should be distinguished from the "reasonable certainty"
standard by which it is commonly said that future consequences and damages in general must be
established. Although the meaning of the latter phrase in tort law is often unclear, actual certainty is
usually not required. See pp. 1371-72, 1374-75 infra.
44. Although courts seldom adopt an actual certainty standard of proof, a few have approached
that result by requiring that an expert's conclusion be expressed in terms approaching that level of
certainty. A court will occasionally go even further. One court not only held that testimony that the
decedent had lost a 75% chance of survival was insufficient, but also seemed to approve an actual
certainty standard of proof. See Hamil v. Bashline, 243 Pa. Super. 227, 235-36, 364 A.2d 1366, 1370
(1976), vacated, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978). The supreme court, in reversing, reaffirmed the
traditional more-likely-than-not standard of proof and relaxed the expert witness requirements in the
instant context, but failed to harmonize adequately the standard of proof and the required form of
expert testimony. Despite semantic variations, most courts do not require that an expert find causation
with a greater degree of certainty than the applicable standard of proof (which usually requires that
causation was probable).
45. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 41, at 241-42; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433B, Comment b (1965) ("It is enough that [the plaintiff] introduces evidence from which reasonable
men may conclude that it is more probable that the event was caused by the defendant than that it
was not.")
The operation of the more-likely-than-not standard of proof in conjunction with the all-or-nothing
approach to the loss of a chance is found in numerous medical malpractice cases involving passive
injuries. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 503 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1974) (must appear more
likely than not that, absent alleged negligence, child's life would have been saved); Bryant v. Rankin,
468 F.2d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1972) (evidence must prove that but for failure of doctors to diagnose
infection, permanent disability would probably be avoided); Davis v. Kemp, 252 Ark. 925, 927, 481
S.W.2d 712, 713 (1972) (must appear probable that but for alleged negligence, complications would
not have ensued); Schenck v. Roger Williams Gen. Hosp., 382 A.2d 514, 518-19 (R.I. 1977) (must
appear that there was reasonable probability that but for alleged negligent diagnosis, patient would
not have suffered injuries claimed).
1367
The Yale Law Journal
proach to the loss of a chance in the passive injury context. In Cooper v.
Sisters of Charity,46 the plaintiff alleged negligence in diagnosis and treat-
ment of the decedent, who had suffered a skull fracture in an accident. At
trial, one physician called as an expert witness by the plaintiff indicated
that " 'there is no possible way . . . to ascertain with any degree of cer-
tainty whether with medical intervention, the individual would have sur-
vived or died.' "4, Another of the plaintiff's expert witnesses testified that
there was about a 50% chance that the victim would have survived had
surgery been performed. 8
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant,
holding that the plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to establish the
requisite causal connection between the allegedly negligent act and the
decedent's death. The court held that the "plaintiff in a malpractice case
must prove that defendant's negligence, in probability, proximately caused
the death." 49 The court defined "probability" as "that which is more
likely than not,"50 and added that "[p]robable is more than 50% of
actual.""1
The third standard of proof on the question of the compensability of a
chance is the "substantial possibility" rule. This standard, most commonly
found in the passive injury context, entitles a plaintiff to recover for a loss
even when there was proof of only a substantial possibility that the result
complained of would have been avoided but for the tortious conduct.
Under this standard, not only could plaintiffs recover for the loss of a not-
better-than-even chance of some favorable result, but the recovery proba-
bly would not be discounted to reflect the magnitude of the chance.12 A
number of recent decisions, although a minority even in the passive injury
context, ostensibly adopt the substantial possibility standard. Careful ex-
amination of many of these cases suggests, however, that their support for
this rule is often limited, problematic, or ambiguous. 3
46. 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
47. Id. at 247, 272 N.E.2d at 101.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 252, 272 N.E.2d at 103.
50. Id. at 253, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
51. Id.
52. Thus, the substantial possibility standard of proof probably does not dispense with the all-or-
nothing approach; it merely improves the plaintiff's odds of receiving all rather than nothing. It is
possible, of course, that courts in some of the substantial possibility cases may have perceived the
problem in terms of compensating loss of a chance valued as such. It is impossible to tell from the
opinions, but one suspects that these courts contemplated a continuation of the all-or-nothing ap-
proach to chance.
53. Ironically, the case most often cited as a leading proponent of the substantial possibility stan-
dard of proof in the passive-injury, preexisting-condition context endorsed that standard in dicta. In
Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), the plaintiff's decedent died from an obstruction
of the intestine. The plaintiff alleged that a Navy doctor was negligent in misdiagnosing the patient's
condition. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint,
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The foregoing analysis has focused primarily on the passive injury situ-
rejecting the district court's conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the doctor's negligence
was the cause of the patient's death. In so holding, the court of appeals proferred the following lan-
guage, which has become a favorite mooring for courts favoring the substantial possibility standard of
proof:
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated a person's chance
of survival, it does not lie in the defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the
chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization. If there was any substantial
possibility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it possible
to demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have happened in circumstances that the
wrongdoer did not allow to come to pass. The law does not in the existing circumstances
require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that the patient would have lived had she been
hospitalized and operated on promptly.
Id. at 632 (emphasis added to "substantial possibility"). This language, taken at face value, seems to
permit redress when the chance of a patient's recovery from a preexisting disease or the chance of
some other favorable result was, even with proper care, not better than even. The Hicks language,
however, was dicta. The uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff's experts was that "if operated on
promptly, [the patient] would have survived." Id. This testimony more than satisfied the more-likely-
than-not standard of proof. Moreover, by saying that "[t]he law does not in the existing circumstances
require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that the patient would have lived," id., the court suggests
that it was rejecting the actual certainty standard of proof but not necessarily the more-likely-than-not
standard. Some subsequent decisions have given Hicks this narrow reading. This was apparently the
interpretation rendered by the same court two years later. See Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 950,
953-54 (4th Cir. 1968) (by implication); c Whitfield v. Whittaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176,
183-84, 169 S.E.2d 563, 568-69 (1969) (mirroring Hicks ambiguity).
A number of other malpractice cases expressly or tacitly purport to adopt the substantial possibility
standard of proof. Upon careful examination, however, many of these cases have features that may
limit their precedential force or scope. In some cases the courts seem to have been swayed by the fact
that the defendant was alleged to have negligently abandoned the plaintiff. See Ascher v. Gutierrex,
533 F.2d 1235, 1237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (sufficient that jury could have concluded that but for
alleged abandonment of plaintiff, he might not have suffered brain damage); c. Maltempo v.
Cuthbert, 504 F.2d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1974) (sufficient that jury could have found that had defendant
not failed to see patient, patient's death "might well have been averted"); Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md.
84, 102, 288 A.2d 379, 390 (1972) (sufficient that jury could have found that alleged failure of doctor
to attend to decedent destroyed "substantial possibility" that he would have survived). See generally J.
KING, supra note 4, at 25 (discussing abandonment).
In some other cases, the court's arguable approval of the substantial possibility standard was ambig-
uous because of a failure expressly to adopt that standard. In Hernandez v. Clinica Pasteur, Inc., 293
So. 2d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), the court held that expert testimony that decedent "would have
had a better chance to survive if he had received prompt medical attention was sufficient to form a
basis for the submission of the issue to the jury." Id. at 750. It is not dear, however, whether the court
intended to adopt a substantial possibility standard of proof, or for some reason found the evidence
sufficient even though the expert testimony was expressed in less probative terms than the traditional
standard of proof. For a similar ambiguity, see Truan v. Smith, 578 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1979).
A few cases appear to afford stronger support for the rule. In Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45
A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974) (per curiam), af'd mem., 37 N.Y. 719, 337 N.E.2d 128, 374
N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975), for example, the plaintiff's own expert testified that even if the decedent had
received timely treatment and thereafter had undergone surgery, she would only have had a 20% to
40% chance of survival. Id. at 179-80, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 510-11. Other physicians testified only that
there was a "possibility" of the decedent's being saved. Id. at 181, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 512 (Steuer, J.,
dissenting). The appellate division held that the jury could find that had the decedent been given
proper medication, her blood pressure "could have been" controlled and she "might have improved
sufficiently" to undergo surgery and make recovery. Id. at 180, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 511. The appellate
division affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, essentially approving the finding of causation under
these circumstances. For an explanation of Kallenberg, see Kimball v. Scors, 59 A.D.2d 984, 399
N.Y.S.2d 350 (1977).
Some courts also have in various ways relaxed the traditional standard of proof in some special
statutory or factual contexts. See, e.g., Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284, 287
(4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963) (duty to attempt rescue of overboard seaman).
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ation. The same analysis can be applied to the active injury context. A
plaintiff could claim that, as a result of the intervention of the defendant's
tortious conduct, he lost the chance to recover from the preexisting condi-
tion or otherwise avoid some untoward consequence of it. The all-or-noth-
ing view of chance would, under one formulation of the prevailing stan-
dard of proof, deny relief for the loss of a not-better-than-even chance of
the favorable result claimed."' For example, a victim of cancer could be
killed on the operating table because of negligently administered anesthe-
sia. The plaintiff would recover for the extent to which the decedent's
death was accelerated, but would receive no damages for the value of the
decedent's chance of being cured of the disease unless that chance rose to
the requisite level."5
Attempts to deal with the problem posed by the destruction of a chance
by tinkering with the standard of proof can only further confuse matters
of loss assignment. If the law on this question is to be rationalized, a
vehicle other than the standard of proof will have to be used. The appro-
priate vehicle is a reevaluation of the traditional ways of thinking about
the interest for which relief is sought and the role of chance in valuing
that interest.
2. Losses Based on Future Consequences
Damages in personal injury tort actions are traditionally awarded in a
single lump sum that is intended fully to compensate the plaintiff for all
past and future consequences 6 of the tort. This approach has required
54. Under one formulation, damages would be recoverable only to the extent that the victim prob-
ably would have avoided future harm in the absence of the tort, and thus there would be no recovery
for loss of a not-better-than-even chance of avoiding future harm. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.
2d 726, 737-40 (3d Cir. 1976); Howell v. Nichols, 22 N.C. App. 741, 743-44, 207 S.E.2d 768, 770-
71, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 211, 209 S.E.2d 316 (1974). Some courts use a somewhat different formula-
tion of the more-likely-than-not standard, stating that damages may not be awarded to the extent that
the preexisting condition would probably have produced future harm independent of the tort. See, e.g.,
Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (2d Cir. 1970); Kegel v. United States, 289 F.
Supp 790, 795 (D. Mont. 1968); Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N.H. 449, 456-57, 163 A.
111, 114-15 (1932). Taken literally, this latter formulation might allow recovery for a loss of an even
chance of loss avoidance.
A few courts speak in terms of reducing damages because of preexisting conditions when it appears
that the preexisting condition was "bound" to worsen. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 328 F.2d
502, 504 (5th Cir. 1964). This language may imply that a somewhat greater likelihood of future
effects from the preexisting condition would have to be found before the preexisting condition would
affect a defendant's liability, thus suggesting a divergence of opinion on the standard of proof in the
active injury situation.
55. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-40 (3d Cir. 1976); Dillon v. Twin State Gas &
Elec. Co., 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 (1932) (discussed at p. 1357 supra). Although the court in Dillon
recognized that the youth's fall prior to his fatal contact with the electrical wires was a preexisting
condition, the court also noted that "[i]f it were found that he would have thus fallen with death
probably resulting, the defendant would not be liable, unless for conscious suffering found to have
been sustained from the shock." Id. at 457, 163 A. at 115 (emphasis added).
56. Damages for future losses may be affected by rules that may require some types of damages,
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triers of fact to peer into the future in an effort to arrive at an appropriate
damages award based upon the anticipated consequences of the tortious
conduct. This problem has two dimensions. The first is whether a tor-
tiously induced condition will continue or develop in the future. The sec-
ond is how that condition, if it does continue or develop, will affect the
victim's future interests, a determination that will depend on what those
interests will be and otherwise would have been.
The issues presented by claims for future consequences and by the ef-
fects of preexisting conditions on such claims are similar analytically to
those involving materialized losses and preexisting conditions. Under the
traditional approach, it must be established under the applicable standard
of proof that the future consequences that will be attributable to the de-
fendant's tortious conduct rather than to other forces, such as preexisting
conditions, are sufficiently likely to occur. Unless these conditions are met,
the plaintiff will not recover for the particular loss.
Future consequences include both loss of a chance of completely avoid-
ing some future loss and future losses of a less definitive nature. The im-
pact of the all-or-nothing principle may vary depending on the type of
future loss involved. Moreover, claims for future consequences and losses
will figure centrally in the determination of damages generally. 7
There have been several formulations of the standard of proof applica-
ble to losses based on future consequences. The most common formulation
requires that the prospect of future consequences and concomitant losses
attributable to the tortious conduct be established, with expert testimony
when needed, 8 with "reasonable certainty." 9 The courts have not been
entirely clear or consistent as to the meaning of this phrase. Most courts
agree that proof of a mere possibility of future consequences will not suf-
fice,"0 but that actual certainty is not necessary. 1 The "reasonable cer-
tainty" standard thus lies somewhere between speculation and actual cer-
tainty. The confusion is compounded by the tendency of some courts to
such as loss of future earnings, to be reduced to present value, and by questions such as the place of
inflation in assessing such damages. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.7
(1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 913A (1979); Note, Future Inflation, Prospective Dam-
ages, and the Circuit Courts, 63 VA. L. REV. 105 (1977). These and other general damages matters
are beyond the scope of this article.
57. That determination will in many respects be subject to the analysis developed in the next
section. See pp. 1373-76 infra.
58. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 10, 22-23 (1968); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 88, 101-02 (1968); Annot.,
18 A.L.R.3d 170, 183-85 (1968).
59. See, e.g., Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 10, 21 (1968) (future pain and suffering); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d
88, 97 (1968) (impaired earning capacity); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 170, 182 (1968) (permanence of
injury).
60. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 10, 24 (1968); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 88, 97 (1968); 18 A.L.R.3d 170,
182 (1968); note 62 infra (citing cases).
61. See Townsend v. Stamper, 398 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Ky. 1965); Duchene v. Wolstan, 258 N.W.2d
601, 605-06 (Minn. 1977); note 59 supra (citing authorities).
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use other terminology. Many courts would probably equate "reasonable
certainty" with the more-likely-than-not standard of proof, or would ex-
pressly adopt the latter standard. 62 As will be seen in the next section,
however, once it is established that a specific consequence or loss will oc-
cur and that the question before the trier of fact relates only to its extent
or amount, the standard of proof has frequently been articulated some-
what differently.
63
There is, then, no recovery for future consequences or losses under the
traditional rule, unless it appears more likely than not that such a conse-
quence or loss will occur that will be attributable to the tortious conduct.
In other words, it would have to appear that the defendant destroyed a
better-than-even chance of avoiding a future condition by reducing by
51% the likelihood of avoiding it."' Absent this, the all-or-nothing rule
operates to deny redress for the chance of such future consequences.
Some courts, however, have exhibited a more rational attitude. The
most notable example is the Oregon case of Feist v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co. 6 ' Although the Feist court did not expressly recognize the compen-
sability of the loss of a not-better-than-even chance of future conse-
quences, it accomplished nearly the same result by allowing recovery for
the tortiously created "susceptibility" to a future disease rather than for
the actual future materialization of the disease. 6 Feist and several other
cases, 7 although representing a minority view, suggest that the traditional
reluctance to allow damages for loss of a chance may be less intractable in
some future consequences contexts. Perhaps the notion of susceptibility is
easier to conceive of rationally than are other types of chances. There is
an obvious similarity between the notion of loss caused by a chance of
future consequences and loss caused by a susceptibility of future conse-
quences. Feist and similar cases thus represent an important step away
from the all-or-nothing principle and in the direction of a straightforward
recognition of the loss of a chance as a compensable interest valued in its
own right.
The results produced by a misalliance of the more-likely-than-not stan-
62. See, e.g., Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 443-45, 378 A.2d 540, 544 (1977); Davidson v.
Miller, 276 Md. 54, 62, 344 A.2d 422, 427-28 (1975); Blakeman v. Gopp, 364 P.2d 986, 992 (Wyo.
1961).
63. See p. 1375 infra.
64. Thus, even if a preexisting condition contributed a 40% likelihood of a future loss, and the
tort contributed an additional 45% likelihood, making it very likely that the loss would occur, the
tortiously created chance would not be compensable under the traditional rule. The probability that a
loss will occur that would be a materialization of the tortiously created risk would be only 45%.
65. 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973). For a further discussion of the Feist case and its extension
in a later Oregon case, see note 96 infra.
66. 267 Or. at 410, 517 P.2d at 679.
67. See J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY § 106 (1972).
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dard of proof and the all-or-nothing approach to loss of a chance are diffi-
cult to justify. The plaintiff who is able to demonstrate a probability of
50% or less that some future loss attributable to the tort will occur will be
denied redress for that prospective loss. Yet it is manifest that the plain-
tiff's interests have been adversely affected.
Future consequences frequently will be deemed partial losses or part of
the damages determination, and may be subject to a more limited applica-
tion of the all-or-nothing concept."8
3. Partial or Less Definitive Losses and Damages Estimation
In some situations, the plaintiff will claim that some partial or less de-
finitive loss did or will result from the tort. In connection with preexisting
conditions, these partial or less definitive losses may include claims that
the tort aggravated a preexisting condition, delayed its cure, failed to slow
its progress, accelerated the onset of harm, or will have such effects in the
future. Thus, even if the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the loss of a
chance of completely avoiding some specific harm, such as cancer-induced
death, he might still be entitled to recover for the loss of a chance to slow
the course of the disease or to mitigate its painful effects. The less defini-
tive types of losses will invariably involve future consequences and loss of
future benefits, regardless of whether a specific preexisting condition is
implicated. Moreover, assessment of damages for both definitive and par-
tial losses is subject to much the same type of analysis as that for partial
losses; indeed, the ideas-proving partial losses and proving dam-
ages-may often overlap. Thus, even when a definitive loss of a chance of
completely avoiding some adverse result has been proved, it still must be
determined what the damages were-what losses would have been avoided
and what benefits achieved had there in fact been complete avoidance.
This damages inquiry in many respects involves essentially the same type
of analysis as that which is applied to partial losses. The defendant gener-
ally is held liable only for the extent to which it appears that the harm
exceeds or will exceed what otherwise would have occurred in the absence
of the tort,69 or, under a substantial-factor formulation, for the harm that
his tortious conduct was a substantial factor in producing.10
The all-or-nothing principle has been applied to the loss of a chance of
avoiding a partial loss, but in a more limited manner. It still must be
established (or disproved, if the burden of proof is shifted to the defen-
dant) under the applicable standard of proof that a tortiously engendered
68. See pp. 1373-76 infra.
69. See pp. 1360, 1361 & note 30 supra.
70. See p. 1356 & note 26 supra.
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harm did or will occur. Short of this proof, the mere possibility of such
harm is insufficient for recovery. Under the traditional standard of proof,
there is no recovery for the loss of a not-better-than even chance of avoid-
ing some partial loss.71 Once some tortiously engendered partial loss, such
as the loss of a better-than-even chance of avoiding some adverse result, is
established, however, the issue becomes the extent of the loss. The all-or-
nothing concept does not operate in this estimation process because the
loss of any chance is automatically integrated into the estimate of the par-
tial or less definitive loss. That estimate should represent the last point (or
highest figure) at which the chance that nontortious conduct would have
averted the particular level of harm was still greater than the chance that
it would not have done so.
72
It is usually much easier to establish that a better-than-even chance of
avoiding at least some partial or less definitive loss has been destroyed
than it is to establish the loss of an opportunity for achieving some fairly
definitive result, such as a full recovery from a disease. Therefore, the all-
or-nothing approach to the loss of a chance tends to work less hardship
and introduces less distortion into the loss-assigning function when ap-
plied to aggravation-acceleration losses and other partial losses than when
applied to more definitive losses.
A similar analysis applies to the assessment of damages. Once at least
some damages of a specific type attributable to a specific tortiously in-
duced condition have been proved, the question becomes one of estimation,
an inquiry in which the all-or-nothing principle does not operate.
Courts commonly state that damages must be established with "reason-
able certainty."73 In considering the proof of damages in general, espe-
cially with respect to the threshold question of whether there are some
specific types of losses or damages attributable to the tort, many recent
tort cases either equate "reasonable certainty" with the traditional more-
71. See, e.g., Grody v. Tulin, 170 Conn. 443, 450-51, 365 A.2d 1076, 1079-80 (1976) (must
appear reasonably probable that but for alleged failure to perform timely surgery, patient's life would
have been prolonged). For various formulations of the standard of proof on the compensability of a
lost chance under the all-or-nothing approach, see pp. 1365-70 supra.
72. For example, a plaintiff might claim that because of a delay in making a diagnosis, his conva-
lescence was needlessly prolonged with resulting harm. Under the traditional rules, damages would be
the product of a two-part inquiry. First, it would have to appear more probable than not that there
was at least some added convalescence attributable to the defendantes tortious conduct-in other
words, that the plaintiff lost a better-than-even chance of avoiding some partial loss. Second, assuming
that this threshold determination were made, the trier of fact would have to estimate the extent of the
added convalescence. In this latter inquiry, the plaintiff in effect is given credit for the chance that an
even greater proportion of his convalescence was attributable to the defendant's conduct; that chance,
however, is discounted by (and discounts) the existence of the same chance that the opposite is true.
Thus, the chance that a better result could have been achieved but for the defendant's tortious conduct
is taken fully into account in arriving at an estimate of the loss.
73. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, § 3.3, at 150; note 59 supra (citing authorities).
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likely-than-not standard of proof, use a reasonably probable standard,"4 or
at least reject the actual certainty standard." When, however, the fact of
such loss or damages is established and the only question is their extent or
amount, courts frequently have elaborated on the standard of proof. Some
simply emphasize that reasonable certainty does not require absolute cer-
tainty,76 but rather represents an "insistence that the trier of fact may not
speculate or conjecture, but must instead have some factual basis for fixing
damages."" Courts often add that once at least some damage or the "fact
of damage" is proved, proof of the extent of the damage is not required
"with mathematical precision."" These statements are not facially incon-
sistent with the traditional more-likely-than-not standard of proof. Courts
have sometimes gone further, however, and described the standard of
proof somewhat differently. Thus, the Restatement suggests that once
some loss is shown, its extent need not always be proved more likely than
not; for some types of damages proof with "as much certainty as the na-
ture of the tort and circumstances permit" will suffice." Some courts
would profess to apply a more-likely-than-not standard of proof to esti-
mates of partial losses and damages, possibly taking into account in some
ill-defined way the damages evidence that was reasonably available. As a
practical matter, many courts would only require sufficient proof, includ-
ing expert testimony when needed, to allow a reasonably accurate estimate
of the probable extent of the tort-based loss and damages, assuming the
plaintiff made reasonable use of the available evidence.80
A few courts occasionally have gone further in relaxing the usual proof
requirements. For example, in the New Jersey case of Betenbaugh v.
Princeton Hospital," the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had negli-
gently taken incomplete X-rays of a patient who had previously injured
74. See, e.g., Powell v. Montgomery, 27 Ohio App. 2d 112, 115-16, 272 N.E.2d 906, 909-910
(1971); Hargrove v. Peterson, 65 Wis. 2d 118, 125, 221 N.W.2d 875, 879-80 (1974); Blakeman v.
Gopp, 364 P.2d 986, 992 (Wyo. 1961); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 26
(1935). Many courts do not even mention the "reasonable certainty" language in discussing proof of
damages, preferring instead to use the traditional (and less ambiguous) "more likely than not" lan-
guage or a similar construct. See, e.g., Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 444-45, 378 A.2d 540, 544
(1977) (using "reasonably probable" standard). It has been suggested that the "reasonable certainty"
phrase may sometimes be regarded as a stricter standard than the "reasonably probable" language.
Note, Awarding Damages for Permanent Injuries: A Proposal to Eliminate the Unreasonableness of
"Reasonable Certainty" in Jordan v. Bero, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 102 n.7 (1975). The trend
appears to be toward confluence of the two formulations.
75. See, e.g, Lobred v. Mann, 395 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Ky. 1965); note 61 supra (citing cases).
76. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 74, §§ 26-27.
77. D. DOBBS, supra note 56, § 3.3, at 151.
78. Id.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979); see id. Comment b.
80. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, § 3.3, at 151, 153. Some types of damages, such as lost profits,
may present special problems. See id. § 8.1, at 541-43.
81. 50 N.J. 390, 235 A.2d 889 (1967) (per curiam). For later developments in New Jersey, see p.
1391 infra.
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her back. The plaintiff further alleged that, as a result, treatment was
delayed, with a concomitant delay in recovery and added suffering. Al-
though there was expert testimony that the alleged negligence had pro-
duced some unnecessary pain and some postponement of recovery, appar-
ently the extent of this additional harm was not explicitly addressed by
the expert testimony or established by other evidence. Nevertheless, the
record was held sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to reach the jury.82 Most
courts, however, would require that evidence, including expert testimony
when needed, afford a reasonable evidentiary basis for estimating the
probable loss. 3
B. Reappraisal of the All-or-Nothing Concept of Chance
Loss of a chance should be compensable even if the chance is not better
than even, and it should be recognized and valued as such rather than as
an all-or-nothing proposition. Any other rule fails to satisfy the goals of
tort law.
1. Compensating the Not-Better-Than-Even Chance
The all-or-nothing approach to the loss of a chance is difficult to defend
for a number of reasons. On a purely conceptual level, it is arbitrary.
When one's claim is based on the destruction of a chance of avoiding some
fairly definitive loss or on the creation of a chance of such a future loss,
the all-or-nothing concept operates radically. A chance that does not rise
to a level consonant with the applicable standard of proof counts for
naught. This is only partly true for destruction of opportunities for avoid-
ing less definitive or partial losses, as well as those damages questions that
are subject to a similar analysis. Once at least some such partial losses or
damages are established under the applicable standard of proof, the trier
of fact must determine the extent of the loss. In answering this question
by arriving at an estimate, chance is by definition integrated into the
calculus. There are, however, no rational reasons for not also compensat-
ing the loss of a chance (however small) of avoiding some partial loss or a
definitive loss.
An example illustrates the arbitrariness of this selective application of
the all-or-nothing concept. Consider a jar containing pennies. Once the
trier of fact finds that the jar probably contains at least some coins, its loss
would be compensable under traditional rules, with its value reflecting an
82. 50 N.J. at 392-93, 235 A.2d at 890.
83. See, e.g., Henderson v. Breesman, 77 Ariz. 256, 259, 269 P.2d 1059, 1061-62 (1954); Valley
Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Haney, 27 Ariz. App. 692, 694, 558 P.2d 720, 722 (1976); Powell v.
Montgomery, 27 Ohio App. 2d 112, 115-23, 272 N.E.2d 906, 909-14 (1971).
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estimate of its contents. In this case it is estimated that the jar contains
forty coins, and there is an identical chance that there are more or less
than forty coins in the jar. The value of the jar of coins based on this
estimate accordingly would be forty cents. Now consider the loss of a
chance to draw one coin from a second jar containing one hundred coins,
forty worth one dollar each and sixty that are valueless. There is a 40%
chance that any one coin picked at random will be worth one dollar. The
estimated value of a chance randomly to draw a coin from this jar is, then,
forty cents. The possibility that the chance is worth more than forty cents
is discounted by the identical chance that it is worth less than forty cents.
The 40% chance is a final estimate, already discounted, just like the esti-
mate of the value of the contents of the first jar. The decision to compen-
sate the former estimate and not the latter makes no more sense than an
arbitrary holding with respect to the first jar that its loss would not be
compensated unless it was estimated to contain at least fifty-one coins.
The limited application of the all-or-nothing principle to the loss of a
chance of avoiding a partial loss-requiring that the lost chance have been
better than even-is also arbitrary. Assume that there are three jars, only
one of which contains an estimated forty cents. Under the traditional rule,
the loss of a one-in-three chance of selecting the jar with coins would not
be compensated. It makes little sense, however, to compensate the estimate
of the number of cents in the jar once it is established that one probably
lost a jar with some coins, but to refuse to compensate the equally valid
estimate of the chance of initially chosing the jar with the coins.
The all-or-nothing approach to loss of a chance also subverts the deter-
rence objectives of tort law by denying recovery for the effects of conduct
that causes statistically demonstrable losses. By placing such losses outside
tort law, the all-or-nothing approach distorts the loss-assigning role of
that law. Over the universe of such cases, losses of chances of avoiding
both the adverse effects of a preexisting condition and the occurrence of
future consequences of an injury represent actual losses. We can be statis-
tically certain, for example, that a number of patients with probably (but
not necessarily) fatal preexisting conditions would have achieved the
hoped-for cure in the absence of the tortious conduct, even if none individ-
ually had a better-than-even chance of doing so. A failure to allocate the
cost of these losses to their tortious sources undermines the whole range of
functions served by the causation-valuation process and strikes at the in-
tegrity of the torts system of loss allocation.
The injustice created by the all-or-nothing concept of chance also cre-
ates pressure to manipulate and distort other rules affecting causation and
damages in an effort to mitigate this perceived harshness. Manipulation of
the standard of proof represented by the substantial possibility test is a
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prime example.84 Such expedients not only threaten to subvert these other
concepts, but also fail to solve the real problem of the all-or-nothing ap-
proach to the loss of a chance.
Destruction of a chance should also be compensated for reasons of fair-
ness. But for the defendant's tortious conduct, it would not have been nec-
essary to grapple with the imponderables of chance. Fate would have run
its course. A defendant's tort not only destroys a "raffle ticket," in so do-
ing it destroys any chance of ever knowing how that ticket would have
fared in the drawing. Recognizing the destruction of a chance as a com-
pensable interest valued as such would also offer the most administrable
and consistent method for dealing with many complicated cases."
On a more visceral level is the question whether one who loses a not-
better-than-even chance of achieving some favorable result, perhaps life,
really loses nothing worthy of redress. The loss includes not only the then-
existing chance, but also the loss of the opportunity to benefit from poten-
tial scientific breakthroughs that could transform the chance into reality.
From a psychological standpoint, there is a qualitative difference between
a condition that affords a chance of recovery and one that offers no chance
at all, as any patient with terminal cancer will confirm. This inherent
worth of a chance is added reason for recognizing its loss as a compensa-
ble interest.
Some courts have recognized the compensability of the loss of a chance
in the case of a contest. Obviously, when a chance to win a contest has a
clearly defined market value-as in the case of a lottery ticket-there is
little difficulty in viewing the chance as an asset."' It would be absurd to
say that a one dollar lottery ticket had no value merely because the pros-
pects of winning with it were not better than even.
The right to recover has also been recognized in some contest cases
when no clear market value for the chance had been established. In
Mange v. Unicorn Press,87 for example, the plaintiff sued the defendant-
84. See pp. 1368-69 supra.
85. Take, for example, a case involving a negligent delay in the diagnosis of cancer. Assume that
by the time the disease was diagnosed, the plaintiff had only a 35% chance of recovering from it.
Assume further that with timely diagnosis the plaintiff would have had an 80% chance of a full
recovery. On the one hand, it appears more likely than not that the plaintiff will not survive. It also
appears that if death ensues, it will probably be a result of negligence. On the other hand, the
probability that the plaintiff not only will not survive, but will not survive because of the defendant's
negligence is only 45% (80% minus 35%), because that is the extent to which the negligent omission
has increased the probability of death. This would probably mean that the lost chance was not then
compensable under the traditional rule. The confusion on this issue would be avoided if the "injury"
is considered to be the loss a 45% chance of cure. If the victim actually died of cancer, the plaintiff
would probably prevail under the traditional rule, and the loss under the suggested approach would
increase because it would then be clear from the facts that the victim was not within the 35% chance
of survival.
86. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, § 3.3, at 156-57.
87. 129 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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encyclopedia publisher for breach of contract on the ground that he was
deprived of a chance to win a puzzle contest. The plaintiff had marked a
statement as "wrong" because the spelling of a word did not correspond to
the spelling contained in the encyclopedia that was, under the contest
rules, the controlling authority. If the plaintiff's answer had not been dis-
qualified, he would have been one of 23,548 contestants to compete for 210
prizes, including a $307,500 first prize. In response to the defendant's
argument that an award of actual damages would be too speculative, the
court said:
[A]lthough there is substantial authority denying recovery. . . there
appears to be a liberal trend towards allowing the jury to determine
the value of the chance of which plaintiff was deprived . . . . The
rationale behind these cases is that plaintiff's chances of success
would have had some market value especially since there was no risk
of out-of-pocket loss offsetting the possibility of gain."8
Although the preponderance of the early decisions seemed to reject the
compensability of losses of a not-better-than-even chance of a single spe-
cific gain, 9 a few subsequent cases imply a more liberal attitude toward
such claims.9 0 A number of commentators favor recovery in such cases,"1 at
88. Id. at 730.
In the famous English case of Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K.B. 786 (C.A.) the defendant was a
theatrical manager who conducted a contest to select twelve beautiful women. The prize for each was
employment on stage for three years at varying pay scales. An initial group of fifty contestants was to
be selected. The plaintiff was chosen as one of the fifty semi-finalists, but because of the defendant's
failure to notify her in time, she did not appear for the final selection. The plaintiff instituted an
action for breach of contract. The Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff awarding
damages to reflect the value of the lost chance of her being selected as one of the twelve winners.
Although the court recognized that each of the fifty finalists' chance of being selected was only about
one in four (thus not better than even), it nevertheless held that such a chance was worthy of redress.
A similar case is that of Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. v. Bell, 197 S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
In Bell, the plaintiff claimed that but for a delay in the shipment of his hogs, he would have won first
rather than second prize at the Fort Worth Stock Show. The court seemed to approve the idea that
loss of the chance itself was compensable, saying:
The chance might be worth little or nothing, or it might be worth, under some circumstances,
the full amount of the premium offered for the best of the class in which plaintiff was to be a
competitor. In such a case, evidence as to all such matters as would tend to show the
probability that the plaintiff would be successful in the competition would be admissible, and
it would then be left to the good sense of the jury trying the case to determine the value of
the plaintiff's chance in the competition.
Id. at 323. This language seems to suggest that the chance itself, even apart from its materialization,
would be compensable. Furthermore, the court seemed to contemplate a measure of compensation that
would reflect the probabilities of the chance's realization. There is disagreement among the commen-
tators as to this interpretation, however. Compare C. MCCORMICK, supra note 74, § 31, at 122-23
(agreeing with preceding interpretation) with D. DOBBS, supra note 56, § 3.3, at 156 n.35
(disagreeing).
89. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 74, § 31, at 122.
90. See id. at 122-23.
91. See, e.g., id.
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least when there is some rational basis for assigning value to the chance.9 2
There has been surprisingly little express analysis of one's right to re-
cover for the loss of a not-better-than-even chance valued as such in per-
sonal injury tort cases.93 The traditional rule in many respects not only
treats chance in all-or-nothing terms but, under the prevailing view, de-
nies recovery for not-better-than-even chances.9 4 Nevertheless, a few cases
seem, with varying degrees of equivocation, to recognize such chances as
compensable interests in their own right free of the all-or-nothing pertur-
bation. 5 In addition, there has been some recent support for compensating
the not-better-than-even chance valued as such in the future consequences
context when such recovery would be denied under traditional rules.9
92. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, § 3.3, at 156-57.
93. There has been scant attention in the legal literature to the place of chance in personal injury
litigation. When the question has been considered, however, the commentators almost uniformly have
favored treating the loss of a chance of avoiding some adverse result as a compensable interest in its
own right, at least in some factual settings. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND
THE LAW 114-15 (2d ed. 1975); A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 3, at 122-30; J. STEIN, supra
note 67, § 106, at 183-84; Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV.
543, 558-59 (1962); Malone, supra note 5, at 80-81. A number of commentators have, to varying
degrees, advocated recognizing chance as a compensable interest for the law of damages in general.
See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 74, § 31, at 122-23; Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of
Damages, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 719, 762 (1978); Note, Damages Contingent Upon Chance, 18
RUTGERS L. REV. 875, 892-94 (1964).
94. See pp. 1364-76 supra.
95. See O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 1971); James v. United States, 483 F.
Supp. 581, 585-86 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Bellaire Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Campbell, 510 S.W.2d 94, 98
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974). None of the foregoing cases represents unequivocal support for compensating
the not-better-than-even chance. In O'Brien, the court merely suggested that loss of a chance of sur-
vival should in some undefined way be included in the damages equation. 443 F.2d at 1019. It did not
expressly acknowledge that the chance was not better than even (although the expert testimony did
not suggest otherwise). O'Brien applied Iowa law, and a later Iowa case apparently retained an all-
or-nothing view of loss of a chance. See Speed v. State, 240 N.W.2d 901, 906 (Iowa 1976).
In James, the plaintiff contended that the defendant's allegedly negligent failure to inform him of a
suspected tumor destroyed a 10% to 15% chance of long-term survival that would have existed if the
tumor had been operable. The court refused to allow recovery for the loss because it did not appear
probable that the tumor had been operable at the time. The court implied that had the existence of
that chance been established, it would have been compensable, although it is unclear whether the
court would have valued the chance as such or treated it as ari all-or-nothing matter under the sub-
stantial possibility rule, see note 53 supra. The court did, however, allow recovery for loss of a chance
of prolonging life or decreasing suffering, "[nmo matter how small that chance may have been." 483 F.
Supp. at 587.
In Bellaire, the jury found that oxygen deprivation, for which the hospital was responsible, caused
the death of the patient. The court implied that damages would include the loss of a chance of recov-
ery from the preexisting condition even if that chance were "remote." 510 S.W.2d at 98. A more
recent Texas case, however, seemed to reject that view, at least in the passive injury context. See Lee
v. Andrews, 545 S.W.2d 238, 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (must appear that, but for failure to diag-
nose condition, patient probably would have survived).
96. In Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973), a child suffered a skull
fracture and sought recovery based on the possibility that he might some day contract meningitis.
Since the expert testimony indicated only a possibility of future meningitis, the court refused to allow
recovery for actual future eventuation of the meningitis. Nevertheless, the court held that the jury's
award could reflect the added "susceptibility" to meningitis. Id. at 413, 517 P.2d at 680. The rule was
extended to allow recovery for a 30-45% possibility of the need for future surgery. See Pelcha v.
United Amusement Co., 44 Or. App. 675, 606 P.2d 1168 (1980).
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Damages for mental distress associated with an injury have been
awarded to compensate plaintiffs for fear of future consequences even
though proof was insufficient to support recovery for the materialization
of those consequences. 7 Although these subjective damages are hardly the
answer to the chance problem, they tend to underscore the reality of
chance in the future consequences context.
Quite recently, the California Supreme Court held that liability could
sometimes be based on and reflect the chance that a defendant was the.
manufacturer of the injury-producing drug. The court held that under the
particular circumstances of this case, each defendant-manufacturer could
be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share
of the relevant market unless it demonstrated that it could not have made
the injuring product.98 Although the case involved problems of causation
rather than the matter of valuation of a lost chance, 9 and although the
decision was a narrow one, it nevertheless is an important signal of the
increased willingness of courts to integrate chance into its resolution of
torts cases.
In summary, the all-or-nothing approach to the loss of a chance irra-
tionally and unfairly denies the reality of chance as an appropriately cog-
nizable interest in the torts system. It also undermines the loss-assigning
function of tort law by improperly externalizing significant costs of vari-
ous enterprises.
2. The Process of Valuing Chance
If one accepts the premise that chance is itself an interest worthy of
redress, one must develop an appropriate method of assigning a value to a
particular lost chance. A number of methods of valuing chance are possi-
ble. Most courts that have recognized chance as a compensable interest
have allowed the trier of fact to value chance without offering meaningful
One judge in a tort case persuasively argued:
[R]equiring a man to stand in the arena and open one of two doors [one housing a tiger] is in
and of itself a separate injury. The fact that a person is confronted with a ten percent, fifteen
percent, or twenty percent probability (in the mathematical sense) that he will suffer future
injuries should be sufficient to permit him to recover for those future injuries at least in pro-
portion to the probability of such injuries occurring.
Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 640-41 (W. Va. 1974) (Neely, J., concurring).
97. See, e.g., Figlar v. Gordon, 133 Conn. 577, 585, 53 A.2d 645, 648 (1947); Anderson v. Weld-,
ing Testing Lab., Inc., 304 So. 2d 351, 353 (La. 1974); Smith v. Boston & M.R.R., 87 N.H. 246,
258-59, 177 A. 729, 738-39 (1935); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 20-22, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252-
53, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999-1000 (1958). But see Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 515,
519, 217 N.W.2d 383, 385 (1974) (fear of cancer). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 54, at
327-33.
98. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 144-46, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980) (discussed in note 116 infra).
99. For a brief discussion of possible application of a chance-valuation mathematical analysis to
issues outside of the valuation inquiry, see pp. 1394-96 infra.
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guidance on how to do so. This method has the advantage of simplicity
and, to the extent that it rests on the jury's common sense, may be com-
patible with the goals of substantial justice. Nevertheless, an important
reason for compensating the loss of a chance is to achieve a more accurate
loss allocation. This being so, a more predictable and finely tuned method
of valuation is preferable.
A better method of valuation would measure a compensable chance as
the percentage probability by which the defendant's tortious conduct di-
minished the likelihood of achieving some more favorable outcome. Under
this approach, the trier of fact would continue to make the valuation, but
would do so within specific guidelines and parameters set by the court.
To illustrate, consider a patient who suffers a heart attack and dies as a
result. Assume that the defendant-physician negligently misdiagnosed the
patient's condition, but that the patient would have had only a 40%
chance of survival even with a timely diagnosis and proper care. Regard-
less of whether it could be said that the defendant caused the decedent's
death, he caused the loss of a chance, and that chance-interest should be
completely redressed in its own right.' 3 Under the proposed rule, the
plaintiff's compensation for the loss of the victim's chance of surviving the
heart attack would be 40% of the compensable value of the victim's life
had he survived (including what his earning capacity would otherwise
have been in the years following death). The value placed on the patient's
life would reflect such factors as his age, health, and earning potential,
including the fact that he had suffered the heart attack and the assump-
tion that he had survived it. The 40% computation would be applied to
that base figure.
In many cases, a plaintiff may claim damages for the destruction of a
chance of avoiding both definitive and partial losses. For example, assume
that a cancer patient is negligently killed by an overdose of medication.
Assume further that he had a 40% chance of recovery and that if he had
recovered he would have lived an estimated thirty-five years. Even if he
had not recovered from the disease, assume that he would have lived an
estimated six months. The plaintiff would claim not only that the dece-
dent was deprived of an opportunity of making a full recovery, but also
that he probably lost six months of life even if the disease would have
,been fatal. Compensation should be calculated in a way that avoids double
recovery for the same injury. The plaintiff would be compensated for the
100. How this proposal for compensating lost chances would operate under the statutes and rules
governing tort actions in which the victim has died raises a host of questions that are beyond the scope
of this article. Some modification of these statutes and rules might be necessary to accommodate the
proposals made here in the type of situation described. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
925-926 (1979).
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full value of the six months by which the decedent's life was probably
shortened even if his cancer had been incurable. To this amount would be
added the value of the chance of living beyond the six months. Thus, we
would add 40% of the value of thirty-four and one-half years of the dece-
dent's life (thirty-five years minus the six months already covered by the
acceleration damages) to the full value of the loss of six months of life.101
The application of the percentage probability test may be more compli-
cated in many situations in which the value of the lost chance depends on
predicting or postulating future events. A plaintiff may claim that the de-
fendant's tort destroyed a chance of avoiding an untoward future develop-
ment, such as blindness. The plaintiff's ultimate claim may include the
loss of some future benefits such as future earnings. Thus, the valuing of a
lost chance may require an appraisal and integration of the prospects that
a physical condition will develop, the offsetting likelihood that it would
have developed independent of the tort, and the prospects "that the victim
would otherwise have received earnings. Valuing these interrelated
chances to arrive at a value of the lost compensable chance is complicated
because each of the interrelated chances often may depend on a number of
possible scenarios.
One could apply the percentage probability test in either of two ways.
Consider its application to a tortious accident to a twenty-year old plain-
tiff that creates a chance that blindness will result in the future. One ap-
proach, which might be termed a "single outcome" approach, would in-
volve two stages. Initially, the trier of fact would determine the most likely
time of onset of blindness. Assume that if blindness does result in the
future, the most likely age of onset for this particular plaintiff would be
age fifty. Assume further that if blindness does occur at fifty, the loss at-
tributable to that condition would be $100,000. Because, however, it is not
certain that the injury will result in blindness, it would not be appropriate
to award the full $100,000. If the probability that the injury will result in
blindness at any time is 30%, one might value the chance at $30,000. 12
101. An expected value computation might also be used to measure the effects of preexisting
conditions on liability for future consequences in this example. See p. 1384 infra.
102. What I have termed the "single outcome" method of applying the percentage probability test
has seldom been articulated as such in the cases. The opinion that probably comes closest to adopting
this test is a concurring opinion in a fairly recent West Virginia case. See Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d
618, 640-41 (W. Va. 1974) (Neely, J., concurring). Under that opinion's recommended approach, not
only would chance be deemed a compensable interest, but its value would reflect its probability of
occurrence. Accordingly, Justice Neely made the following suggestion:
[T]he jury would be instructed that from all the evidence they should determine [usually with
the aid of expert testimony] what the overall probability is that the plaintiff will suffer future
damages, and that from all the evidence they should determine the amount of monetary dam-
ages to which the plaintiff would be entitled if the disabilities which doctors reasonably believe
are possible actually come to pass. The jury would then be instructed to multiply the amount
of future damages reasonably to be expected times the probability of those damages actually
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A second and more precise method of applying the percentage
probability test involves application of an "expected value"1 '3 or
"weighted mean" computation. This process would require computing a
"weighted average of all the possible outcomes, the weight assigned to
each outcome being determined by the likelihood of its occurrence.'
04
Elaborating on the preceding example, assume, in an admittedly oversim-
plified set of facts, that as a result of the accident there is a 25% chance of
the onset of injury-induced blindness occurring at fifty years of age, a 4%
chance at forty, a 1% chance at thirty, and a 70% chance that such blind-
ness would never result. Assume further that these are the only possible
outcomes. Finally, assume that if blindness occurs at age fifty the loss
would be $100,000; if at age forty, $200,000: and if at age thirty,
$300,000. Under the expected-value approach, the chance would be val-
ued by aggregating the possible outcomes discounted to reflect their degree
of likelihood. Thus, we would add $25,000 (25% of $100,000), $8,000 (4%
of $200,000), $3,000 (1% of $300,000), and $0 (70% of $0), giving a total
value of the chance of injury-induced blindness of $36,000. In this exam-
ple, the expected-value method produced a higher damage figure than the
single-outcome test. Under a different set of probabilities, however, the
opposite might be true. The difference can be pronounced, especially as
the prospects of occurrence of an adverse consequence approach 100%.t"'
Each of the percentage methods of valuation has advantages and draw-
backs. The single-outcome method is less complex and requires fewer
computations. The expected-value construct could involve a virtually un-
limited number of permutations that would have to be weighted before
they could be aggregated to arrive at the value of the chance. The real
advantage of the expected-value method, however, is that it more precisely
measures the value of a chance. The single-result method is subject to
some of the criticisms leveled at the all-or-nothing view of chance. While
valuing the most likely chance, other less likely chances are not accurately
valued except by generally discounting the most likely chance to reflect the
probability of any occurrence. The expected-value method therefore is
more consonant with a central purpose of valuing chance: achieving a
more rational and accurate loss allocation. Moreover, the administrative
occurring and arrive at a figure which will compensate the plaintiff for the possibility of future
injuries.
Id. at 641. One commentator has interpreted the opinion as suggesting an "expected value" method of
computation. See Schaefer, supra note 93, at 746. Justice Neely's language, however, appears to come
much closer to the "single outcome" method of valuation.
103. See Schaefer, supra note 93, at 722.
104. Id. For an explanation of expected value, see P. HOEL, ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 90-94 (4th
ed. 1976).
105. Recovery for future consequences should, under either approach, be reduced to present value
to the extent required by damages rules. See note 56 supra.
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problems associated with this method are surmountable."°6
The presence of a preexisting condition may add an additional factor to
the valuation process in claims for future consequences. That a preexist-
ing condition has created a chance of future losses should be taken into
account in assessing the loss for which the defendant is held responsible.107
On its face, the proposed percentage rule may appear to be a relatively
complex method for valuing chance. Yet similar determinations are re-
quired constantly even under the traditional rules. How else, for example,
do we even know whether we are talking about a better-than-even chance
when applying the all-or-nothing rule? Professor Tribe, who has ex-
pressed reservations about excessive use of mathematics in trials, has con-
ceded that all factual evidence is ultimately statistical and probabilistic in
the epistemological sense.108 Moreover, even if, as a general matter, there
is some truth in Tribe's conclusion that "the costs of attempting to inte-
grate mathematics into the factfinding process of a legal trial outweigh the
benefits,"'0 9 the use of probabilistic analysis in the limited context of loss
valuation appears not only warranted, but essential, if chance is to be
deemed a compensable interest. Especially if one considers the alternatives
either of affording no meaningful guidance to the trier of fact or, even
worse, of retaining the all-or-nothing approach to loss of a chance, the
proposed percentage rule appears both workable and advantageous. As
Professor Kaye correctly suggests, the only real question should be
"whether the [probability] technique would reduce the number of errors
in factfinding."' ' t The methodology postulated here demonstrably would.
106. Administrative problems that inhere in the potentially infinite number of future possible
outcomes can be substantially alleviated by limiting the number of possible outcomes through group-
ing. Thus, rather than engaging in a surrealistic exercise of weighing the value of the chance of
something transpiring at each hour, minute, or second of the victim's future, possibilities could be
consolidated. For example, the chance of future blindness could be valued by dividing the life expec-
tancy of the plaintiff into one-year segments. The loss from blindness occurring during each segment
could be estimated by computing the loss for the most likely moment of onset during that segment.
That loss could then be discounted to reflect the likelihood of occurrence at any time during that
segment. Finally, the value for these weighted risks of all segments would be aggregated to form the
expected value of the chance. This procedure, accordingly, would draw upon the expected value
method for the final computation, but would employ a single outcome analysis within each segment.
The creative use of expert witnesses to assist the trier of fact should also considerably facilitate the
valuation process.
107. Thus, assume that a tortious head injury creates a 40% chance of the victim developing
epilepsy at a specified age. Assume also that because of a preexisting condition the victim already had
a 20% chance of developing the disease. The plaintiff would be compensated for the extent to which
the tort, by creating a 40% chance of epilepsy, increased the existing risk and in so doing reduced the
80% chance of avoiding the disease.
Preexisting conditions not relating to the same bodily consequences to which the tort relates should
also be taken into account.
108. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1329, 1330 n.2 (1971).
109. Id. at 1377.
110. Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34, 36 (1979).
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As a purely technical matter, valuing chance appears to be well within
the competency of science"'t The probability of a lost chance can be de-
rived in a number of ways. One may deduce the probability figure from
so-called "relative frequency""' by looking at the way in which the same
or similar forces operated in the past. Even when hard empirical data
from which to extrapolate a percentage valuation of a chance is not avail-
able, other estimating methodologies may be used. One might use the per-
sonalistic theory for estimating probability,' in which the trier of fact is
presented with a hypothetical gambling situation and is offered a hypo-
thetical reward for making a correct choice among possibilities." 4 This
process can be refined quantifiably by asking the trier of fact a series of
questions-for example, whether he would prefer either betting on the
existence of a given fact or taking a chance on selecting a specific card or
category of card from a deck.' By extrapolating from the known
probabilities of selecting the card and the preferences of the trier of fact,
we arrive at an estimate of the probability of a given event." 6
111. Medical science, for example, has become skilled in predicting the probabilities of survival
for various diseases and traumatic injuries. See, e.g., Bruce, Gennarelli, & Langfitt, Resuscitation
from Coma Due to Head Injury, 6 CRITICAL CARE MED. 254 (1978); Shapiro, The Evaluation of
Clinical Predictions, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1509 (1977). More accurate methods for analyzing risk
factors generally have also been developed. See, e.g., Miettinen, Standardization of Risk Ratios, 96
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 383 (1972); Walter, Calculation of Attributable Risks from Epidemiological
Data, 7 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 175 (1978).
112. Iversen, Operationalizing the Concept of Probability in Legal-Social Science Research, 5
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 331, 331 (1971). Iversen illustrates relative frequency as follows:
[Iln coin tossing, to find the probability of a coin coming up heads I toss the coin n times and
observe that x of those tosses produce heads. The relative frequency of heads is x/n, and when
n increases to infinity this relative frequency equals the probability of heads.
Id.
113. See Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1066-67
(1968); Tribe, supra note 108, at 1347-49.
114. See Kaplan, supra note 113, at 1067.
115. See id.; Wagner, Book Review, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1072 n.6 (reviewing L.J. COHEN,
THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977)).
116. Courts have, in recent years, shown increased willingness to apply mathematical percentage
computations to resolve difficult legal dilemmas in personal injury litigation. In Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980),
for example, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries allegedly resulting from consumption by her
mother of the miscarriage-preventing drug "DES." The drug was found to cause vaginal cancer in
daughters whose mothers had taken DES before giving birth. Unfortunately, the plaintiff was unable
to establish which manufacturer was the source of the DES taken by her mother. Nevertheless, the
court held that because the drug was manufactured from a single formula, because the plaintiff
through no fault of her own was unable to identify the source, and because the plaintiff joined as
defendants in the action the manufacturers of a substantial share of the DES that her mother may
have taken, each defendant would be subject to liability for the proportion of the judgment reflecting
its percentage share of the relevant product market, unless it demonstrated that it could not have made
the dose that caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The
kind of proportional mathematical computation envisioned in Sindell, although dealing with causation
rather than valuation, and based on what is perhaps more readily quantifiable data, involved a process
similar to that required to allocate responsibility between a preexisting condition and a tortious injury,
and to value the loss of a chance.
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In short, valuing chance is feasible. Moreover, in spite of its unavoida-
ble inexactness, the compensation of lost chances will introduce a substan-
tially higher level of precision and, therefore, validity into the loss-as-
signing process. As one commentator aptly noted, "[t]he impossibility of
absolute certainty does not mean that we cannot make our factfinding ap-
paratus substantially better than it is."1
117
3. Better-Than-Even Chances
The percentage probability test has thus far been discussed as an an-
swer to the problem of the loss of a not-better-than-even chance of some
favorable result and the creation of a not-better-than-even chance of fu-
ture consequences. Once we accept the notion that chance is itself an in-
terest entitled to redress and that chance should be measured by a mathe-
matical percentage probability test, we are faced with the question
whether that same method of valuation should also be applied to better-
than-even chances as well.
Under the prevailing all-or-nothing rule, most courts probably would
value the better-than-even chance as though it had materialized or were
certain to do so. They would not, in other words, treat such a chance as a
chance at all, but as a certainty.118 To illustrate, assume that a patient
died from a ruptured appendix that was negligently misdiagnosed. As-
sume further that the patient would have had a 95% chance of survival
with timely diagnosis and treatment. In figuring damages in such a case
most courts, applying the all-or-nothing concept, would award damages
based on 100% of the value that the decedent's life would have had if he
had recovered from his appendicitis.
This result is as questionable as the extreme reached when the all-or-
nothing concept denies any redress for the destruction of a not-better-
than-even chance. By compensating the 95% chance as though it were
100%, courts overcompensate the plaintiff. Both types of chance should be
valued in a way that reflects their probability of occurrence. Such an ap-
proach would also promote a more accurate loss allocation.
C. A Note on Conjunction
The outcome of both the causation and valuation inquiries may often
depend on a number of constituent factual premises. An important ques-
117. Kaplan, supra note 113, at 1071.
118. Thus, loss of a better-than-even chance of avoiding a definitive or some partial loss would
not be discounted by the chance that the loss would have occurred in any event. In estimating the
extent of the partial loss suffered and damages generally for both types of losses, however, the chance
that a greater or lesser loss had been or will be suffered would, under the traditional rules, be inte-
grated into the estimation. See pp. 1373-76 supra.
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tion is whether the probability of these constituent premises should be
conjoined or should be treated independently in determining whether the
standard of proof is satisfied. If the constituent probabilities are conjoined,
the plaintiff's burden19 is increased exponentially, because "mathematical
probability obeys a multiplicative conjunctive principle, whereby the
probability that two independent events both occur is equal to the mathe-
matical product of their individual probabilities.""12 Thus, the probability
of throwing an ace with a single die is one in six; the probability of
throwing two aces with a simultaneous throw of two dice is one in thirty-
six.12 1 A similar principle determines the probability of two conclusions
that are to some extent interdependent: "the probability that both of two
events will occur is equal to the probability that the first event will occur,
multiplied by the conditional probability that the second event will occur
when it is known that the first event [has occurred or] is certain to
occur."
1 2 2
A plaintiff may allege, for example, that the defendant's uninsulated
wires caused the victim's death. It might appear that there was a 60%
probability that the victim was electrocuted by a live wire and a 60%
probability that, if by a wire, then by the defendant's wire.123 Applying
the conjunctive principle to this illustration, we find that the probability
that the defendant's wire caused the death was 36% (60% x 60%). This
probability would not satisfy the traditional more-likely-than-not standard
of proof. If, however, each constituent factual premise were addressed in
isolation, each individually would appear more likely than not. Thus, the
decision whether to apply the conjunction principle might well determine
the outcome of the causation question. Most courts, if forced explicitly to
confront the question, would probably opt for the conjunction principle on
the causation question: authorities generally state the standard of proof on
the causation element in terms of proving that the ultimate fact of causa-
tion, rather than each constituent fact, was more likely than not.12
119. This assumes, arguendo, that the burden of proof remains on the plaintiff. See generally pp.
1390-94 infra.
120. L.J. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 51-52 (1977).
121. See P. LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES 12-13 (6th French ed. F. Trus-
cott & F. Emory trans. 1902).
122. P. HOEL, supra note 104, at 51. Thus, if the probability of A is 40%, and the probability of
B is 60% if A occurs, then the probability of A and B would be 24% (the product of 40% and 60%).
123. For present purposes, these hypothetical percentages should be deemed to represent syntheses
of all relevant evidence on the particular point. Thus, the instant analysis should not be taken as
addressing the different matter of the use of pure statistical and mathematical evidence in trials. Com-
pare Kaye, supra note 110, with Tribe, supra note 108. Use of relevant statistical data, however,
should be an important part of the valuation process. See pp. 1381-87 supra.
124. The Restatement, for example, states: "It is enough that [the plaintiff] introduces evidence
from which reasonable men may conclude that it is more probable that the event was caused by the
defendant than that it was not." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, Comment b (1965).
Wigmore speaks generally of the burden of proving those "propositions. . . which are a prerequisite"
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The question of the applicability of the conjunction principle also arises
with respect to valuation. Although courts will often acknowledge that
there are many phases to the valuation inquiry, they seldom explain how
the different variables affecting the value of a chance interrelate, or
whether the conjunction principle should apply. Since most courts require
that the lost chance of the favorable outcome have been more likely than
not to have occurred absent the tort, they apparently would apply the
conjunction principle to the valuation inquiry.'2 1 The conjunction princi-
ple should be an indispensable feature of the valuation process. Admit-
tedly, the principle tends to compound the harshness of the all-or-nothing
approach. The solution, however, lies not in an abandonment of the con-
junction principle, but in rejection of the irrational all-or-nothing ap-
proach to loss of a chance. Consider a victim suffering from preexisting
cancer who is killed in an accident. If there was a 60% probability that
the cancer would otherwise have been diagnosdd when the cure rate
would have been 70%, the loss of a chance of a cure should be valued at
42% of the value of the life of the victim as cured.
While the conjunction principle should apply within the causation in-
quiry and within the probabilities in the valuation inquiry, it should not
apply between them, given the current state of the law. As has already
been argued, causation and valuation are analytically different concepts.
The causation inquiry determines whether a defendant should be required
to compensate a plaintiff for a loss. The valuation inquiry determines how
much compensation is required. Application of the conjunction principle
between causation and valuation would be impossible if causation contin-
to a party's right of action. 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE § 2485, at 272-73 (1940).
Both sides of the debate over the extent to which an inference may be based on an inference seem
implicitly to support the conjunction principle. See generally id. at § 41; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 3, § 19.4, at 1071. Since restrictions on inference-to-inference reasoning may be even more
restrictive than the conjunction principle, those favoring such a restriction would necessarily prefer the
conjunction principle over a nonconjunction approach. Those rejecting arbitrary limits on inference-
to-inference reasoning would find the conjunction principle a logical alternative.
125. This is true of the cases cited in note 45 supra. When the conjunction principle is impliedly
rejected, the reason for the rejection may be a desire to avoid the harshness of the all-or-nothing
approach to loss of a chance. In Speed v. State, 240 N.W.2d 901 (Iowa 1976), the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's negligence caused him to become blind. The Iowa Supreme Court found that reasona-
ble men could differ on the causation (valuation) question. The court perceived the issue in terms of
whether proper and prompt examination and tests probably would have discovered the plaintiff's
condition, whether that discovery probably would have led to prompt treatment, and, if the treatment
had been proper, whether it probably would have prevented the patient's blindness. Id. at 905-07.
Thus, the court implicitly suggested that it would be sufficient for the standard of proof to be satisfied
for each individual step, regardless of whether it was probable that absent the alleged negligence the
blindness would have been averted.
There are two basic fallacies in the Speed case. First, implicit in the court's approach is approval of
the all-or-nothing attitude to loss of a chance. The real question should have been what the lost
chance of avoiding blindness was worth. The second fallacy is the apparent failure of the court to
employ the conjunction principle.
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ued to be handled as an all-or-nothing proposition, but valuation were
derived from a percentage probability analysis, as this article urges. If the
all-or-nothing approach were retained for valuing the loss of a chance,
causation and valuation could be conjunctively melded, but to do so would
simply compound the injustice and irrationality of the all-or-nothing
method. If, on the other hand, the percentage probability analysis were
not only adopted for valuation purposes, but also extended to causation, a
question beyond the scope of the present article, 2" the conjunction princi-
ple could feasibly be applied between the concepts of causation and
valuation.
D. Burden of Proof
In torts cases,, the burden of proof
1 27 on causation M  and valuation 12'
questions has, in general, been placed on the plaintiff. Generalization
about the burden of proof in the context of preexisting conditions, how-
ever, is more difficult because of a failure of the courts adequately to dis-
tinguish and separate causation and valuation.
Once a preexisting condition has been established, it is necessary to de-
termine who must prove the effect of this preexisting condition on causa-
tion and valuation. Except to the extent noted below, the plaintiff would
ordinarily be required to prove the cause and extent of the total loss.
When a tortious aggravation or acceleration of (or perhaps other injury in
addition to) a preexisting condition of innocent origin has caused some
loss, the cases are divided on who must prove how much of the total loss
arising in that context is attributable to the tort. While the traditional
view left this burden on the plaintiff,13 0 there has been growing support
for shifting that burden to the defendant for both actively"' and passively
caused injuries. The application of this approach in the passive injury
context, when the question was how much harm was reasonably avoida-
126. See pp. 1394-96 infra.
127. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 336.
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(l) (1965). The Restatement shifts the burden
in two situations. See id. § 433B(2)-(3).
129. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, § 3.3, at 150, § 3.7 at 189.
130. See, e.g., Henry v. Landreth, 254 Ark. 483, 486, 494 S.W.2d 114, 117 (1973); Walters v.
Smith, 222 Md. 62, 65-66, 158 A.2d 619, 620-21 (1960); Valliere v. Filfalt, 110 N.H. 331, 333, 266
A.2d 843, 845 (1970); Morris v. Rogers, 80 N.M. 389, 390-91, 456 P.2d 863, 864-65 (1969); Howell
v. Nichols, 22 N.C. App. 741, 743-44, 207 S.E.2d 768, 770-71, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 211, 209 S.E.2d
316 (1974).
131. See, e.g., Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1172-74 (2d Cir. 1970) (by implica-
tion); Stephens v. Koch, 192 Colo. 531, 533-34, 561 P.2d 333, 334 (1977); Matsumoto v. Kaku, 52
Hawaii 629, 630-34, 484 P.2d 147, 149-51 (1971) (by implication); Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 672-
74, 429 P.2d 397, 404-06 (1967); Becker v. D & E Distrib. Co., 247 N.W.2d 727, 729-30 (Iowa
1976).
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ble, is illustrated in Fosgate v. Corona."' The plaintiff in Fosgate sued
the defendant-doctor for failing to diagnose the patient's long-standing tu-
berculosis. The New Jersey Supreme Court, noting the difficulty of sepa-
rating the harm, held that the defendant had the "burden of segregating"
damages for which he was responsible from those "solely incident to the
preexisting condition."'
When the preexisting condition is also the result of tortious conduct," 4
some courts appear even more willing to shift to the defendant the burden
of unraveling the various influences. When the defendant's tortious con-
duct contributes along with the torts of others to produce harm, even
though it does not constitute a but-for or substantial-factor cause of the
entire harm, the Restatement of Torts may place on the defendant the
burden of proving how liability should be apportioned between the loss
attributable to his conduct and the harm (presumably including the effects
of preexisting conditions) caused solely by the other tortfeasors."' The
132. 66 N.J. 268, 330 A.2d 355 (1974).
133. Id. at 273, 330 A.2d at 358. A similar rule was applied in Graham v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 995,
998 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Another rationale for shifting the burden of proof to the defendant in these situations has been aptly
stated in one famous California case. In Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91
Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970), the California Supreme Court noted:
[Tihe evidentiary void in the instant action results primarily from defendants' failure to pro-
vide a lifeguard to observe occurrences within the pool area . . . . The absence of such a
lifeguard in the instant case thus not only stripped decedents of a significant degree of protec-
tion to which they were entitled, but also deprived the present plaintiffs of a means of defini-
tively establishing the facts leading to the drownings.
Id. at 771, 478 P.2d at 474-75, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 754-55. The court went on to hold that in the type of
circumstances presented, upon proof that the defendant violated a duty to provide a lifeguard, the
burden shifted to the defendants. Id. at 772, 478 P.2d at 475, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
Unlike the preceding cases dealing with partial losses in which some such loss was proved, Haft
involved a definitive loss. Most courts, unlike that in Haft, require the plaintiff to establish that the
defendant caused a definitive loss or some partial loss before the question of the burden of proof on
apportionment is even reached. See notes 45, 46 & 71 supra (citing cases). Under the suggested
approach to chance, however, this threshold requirement would be satisfied by proof that the
defendent destroyed a chance of loss avoidance.
134. For other problems involved when the source of the preexisting condition is tortious, see pp.
1362-63 supra.
135. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965). Some courts have imposed joint and
several liability directly rather than by shifting the burden of proof when they have found the harm
incapable of apportionment as a matter of law. See note 20 supra. Flatly imposing joint and several
liability for the entire harm (rather than shifting the burden of proof) is probably unsound except
when the defendant's conduct was a cause of the entire harm and the other forces did not constitute
preexisting conditions. See pp. 1359-60 supra.
When a tortious preexisting condition was a cause of the harm that the defendant caused, see W.
PROSSER, supra note 3, § 52, at 320-21, the defendant should have the benefit of a possible reduction
of his liability to the plaintiff to the extent of the harm attributable solely to the preexisting condition
(even if the burden of apportionment is shifted to the defendant), and the tortfeasors might be entitled
to seek contribution or indemnity inter se for that portion of the loss for which both were responsible.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 886A-886B (1979). A number of courts, how-
ever, have refused to classify the tortfeasors as joint tortfeasors in this context and have accordingly
disallowed contribution; other courts have held them jointly and severally liable and allowed contribu-
tion for the loss for which both were responsible. The situations and approaches have been so diver-
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Restatement is unclear, however, on the extent, if at all, to which the
conduct of the tortfeasors must be contemporaneous for the rule shifting
the burden of proof to apply." 6 In most multiple tortfeasor cases in which
the courts have shifted the burden, i" 7 the injuries occurred almost simulta-
neously or in rapid succession. " The automobile accident involving a
chain collision is the most common example."" The courts are more di-
vided when the accidents do not occur in such limited time frames.
1 40
There are indications that the rule gradually is being extended to situa-
tions in which injuries occur at somewhat different times.'"
gent as practically to defy generalization. Joint and several liability and rights to contribution may
also arise when the defendant is unable to apportion the harm.
When a tortious preexisting condition was not a cause of the harm that the defendent caused, one of
two results ordinarily occurs: first, the defendant might be held liable to the plaintiff for harm the
defendant caused in excess of that attributable to the preexisting condition, but would have no right of
contribution for that harm, or second, if the burden of apportionment were shifted to him and he was
unable to apportion, he would be held jointly and severally liable for the entire harm but with a
possible right of (and potential liability for) contribution, or perhaps even indemnity, see, e.g., Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094-96 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974). See also pp. 1362-63 supra (discussing subsuming injuries). The defendant's right to contribu-
tion would depend on whether the prior tortfeasor was also a "joint tortfeasor" (that is, was liable for
the same harm). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979). Whether the prior tortfeasor
would be a joint tortfeasor may depend on whether the burden of apportionment was also shifted to
(and not satisfied by) him, a point on which the courts have reached differing results. Compare, e.g.,
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094-96 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974) (each tortfeasor jointly and severally liable for entire harm unless apportionment is
proved) with Bruckman v. Pena, 29 Colo. App. 357, 359-62, 487 P.2d 566, 567-68 (1971) (first
tortfeasor not liable for subsequent harm and does not have burden of apportioning).
In the multiple tortfeasor context, a defendant may not always ultimately benefit from an appor-
tionment even though it reduces his liability to the plaintiff. Whether he would benefit would depend
on the net costs and benefits of apportionment in terms of its reduction of his liability to the plaintiff
and on the effect (if any) of an apportionment on the defendant's rights to and liabilities for contribu-
tion or indemnity that would have existed in the absence of an apportionment. The potential effects of
settlement, release, and satisfaction should also be considered. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 885-886A (1979).
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) & Comments c-e (1965).
137. Even when the harm occurs within a limited period of time, courts have sometimes refused to
shift the burden. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-39 (3d Cir. 1976) ("crashworthiness"
situation, see note 25 supra; assuming arguendo that other force was tortious). The "crashworthiness"
cases appear split on the question. See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL
176 (2d ed. 1981).
138. See, e.g., Gutowski v. City of New Britain, 165 Conn. 50, 54-55, 327 A.2d 552, 555 (1973)
(alleged assaults by two police officers occurring in same incident).
139. See, e.g., Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 434-36, 108 N.W.2d 33, 37-38 (1961); Ma-
thews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 20-23, 178 N.W.2d 841, 844-45 (1970); Hill v. Macomber, 103 N.J.
Super. 127, 136-37, 246 A.2d 731, 736-37 (1968).
140. Compare, e.g., Treanor v. B.P.E. Leasing, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 4, 5-7 (Iowa 1968) (joint and
several liability imposed unless, damages shown, presumably by defendant, to be reasonably capable of
apportionment) with Ryan v. Mackolin, 14 Ohio St. 2d 213, 220-22, 237 N.E.2d 377, 382-83 (1968)
(two collisions occurring five months apart; burden of proof remains on plaintiff to apportion
responsibility).
141. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094-96 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (multiple failures to warn of danger of work-related exposure to
asbestos); c. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337, 342-43 (Tenn. 1976) (third-party com-
plaint for contribution in nuisance action).
A medical malpractice case that has shifted the burden of proof in this type of situation illustrates
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In evaluating the question of the placement of the burden of proof in
the preexisting injury situation, it should be noted that when the all-or-
nothing view of the loss of a chance is rejected, the effect of the placement
of the burden of proof will often be less decisive than under traditional
rules. Thus, under the suggested approach to chance, even if the burden of
proof remains on the plaintiff he would still be able to recover for the loss
of a not-better-than-even chance of loss avoidance.
Assuming proof of a preexisting condition and proof that the defendant
caused some harm such as loss of a chance, it seems best to adopt the
following approach to the burden of allocating the loss between the tort
and the preexisting condition, regardless of the origin of that condition: if
the preexisting condition and the effect of the defendant's tortious conduct
attach nearly simultaneously or within a relatively short time, the burden
of proving the extent to which the preexisting condition reduced the value
of the interest in question should be shifted to the defendant. If a defen-
dant seeks to reduce his liability by asserting that part of the harm is not
attributable to his tortious conduct, the burden of proving both that the
plaintiff's injury is capable of apportionment and what the apportionment
should be should rest on the defendant. Under the suggested approach to
chance, this requirement would include determining the extent to which
the preexisting condition reduced the value of the chance-interest ad-
versely affected by the defendant's tortious conduct.
When a significant time interval separates the attachment of the preex-
isting condition from the harm inflicted by the defendant, the burden of
establishing the extent to which the plaintiff's condition is attributable to a
particular defendant's conduct-that is, the value of the interest
lost-should remain on the plaintiff, subject to one exception. If the plain-
tiff can demonstrate that he had no reasonable opportunity separately to
the trend. In Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971), the patient had taken an antibi-
otic prescribed by her pediatrician and for which prescription refills subsequently were authorized by
an osteopath. Subsequently, the patient died of aplastic anemia induced by the drug. Id. at 269-73,
282 A.2d at 210-12. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's verdict of negligence against both the pediatrician and the osteopath. One of the
osteopath's arguments was that no causal connection had been established between the doses of the
drug that he had authorized and the aplastic anemia. In effect, the osteopath contended that the harm
had already been suffered or predestined before the doses of medication he authorized had been ad-
ministered. In response, the court held that once it was established that the immediate cause of death
was drug-induced aplastic anemia, the burden of proof shifted to the defendants to prove which series
of doses (or whether both) were the fatal ones. Id. at 284-85, 282 A.2d at 218.
The Incollingo case is complicated by the presence of both causation and valuation questions. If the
earlier doses of the antibiotic would have killed the patient at the time that she did in fact die, the
osteopath's refills could not have been a cause of death unless they were also substantial factors in
producing the death. If the osteopath's refills were also either a but-for or substantial-factor cause, the
question of what effect the earlier doses, as a preexisting condition, would have on the osteopath's
liability would have to be determined. See notes 25 & 26 supra.
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evaluate the injury inflicted by the defendant, 42 the burden of proving the
proper apportionment should be shifted to the defendant, or he should be
subject to liability without any reduction in damages for the preexisting
condition. Moreover, when the plaintiff can prove that because of the tort
it was not reasonably possible to prove that there was an existing chance
at the time of the tort, the defendant should bear the burden on that issue
as well.
Shifting the burden of proof as suggested above can be justified on sev-
eral grounds. As a matter of basic fairness, a plaintiff should not be disad-
vantaged merely because a preexisting condition has complicated the allo-
cation of responsibility. Furthermore, to the extent that the defendant's
conduct has denied the plaintiff any reasonable opportunity to assess his
prior condition, this inflicted imponderability can be thought of as a form
of injury. When a physician fails to diagnose a preexisting disease, the
subsequent lack of information from which to assess the patient's preexist-
ing condition may have resulted largely from the misdiagnosis itself. Simi-
larly, the burden should be shifted to the defendant when he actively in-
flicts an injury that, because of its nature or because it follows so closely
on the heels of the materialization of a preexisting condition, makes it
infeasible for the plaintiff to assess his preinjury condition.
Shifting the burden of proof is not a completely satisfactory solution as
long as an all-or-nothing lottery survives. The shift simply realigns the
scales. In the context of preexisting conditions, then, shifting the burden of
proof should be viewed as collateral to the task of reforming the definition
of the injury to include loss of a chance.
III. Causation, Valuation, and Chance Revisited
The foregoing discussion has focused on the place of chance in the valu-
ation process and upon alternatives to the all-or-nothing approach to the
loss of a chance in that context. Throughout, an assiduous attempt has
been made to preserve the distinction between causation and valuation.
Rejection of the all-or-nothing approach to valuing the loss of a chance
does not necessarily affect the continuing validity of the all-or-nothing
rule for the causation inquiry. Thus, while the loss of a not-better-than-
even chance of avoiding some adverse result should be a compensable loss,
it still must be established that the defendant caused the destruction of
that chance. The all-or-nothing principle would ordinarily still operate in
the causation inquiry even if it were abandoned for the purposes of valu-
142. The fact that the plaintiff had an opportunity medically to evaluate his preexisting condition
prior to the second injury has apparently influenced some courts against shifting the burden of proof,
especially if there was "medical scrutiny" of the preexisting condition. See, e.g., Ryan v. Mackolin, 14
Ohio St. 2d 213, 222, 237 N.E.2d 377, 383 (1968).
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ing a lost chance.
To illustrate, assume that a patient suffering from cancer is killed be-
cause a surgical instrument fails due to errors in the manufacturing pro-
cess. Assume that the chance that the patient would be cured of cancer
was only 30%. Under the approach proposed in this article, the loss of
that chance would be compensable. But if it did not appear more likely
than not that the defendant was the manufacturer of the instrument, the
plaintiff would ordinarily be denied recovery for that loss. 1 43 In other
words, proof of a not-better-than-even chance that the defendant caused
the loss of the chance of a cure would not suffice. If, however, the plaintiff
proved that the defendant was probably the source of the product and thus
the cause of the loss, the plaintiff might recover the value of the loss.
Thus, the all-or-nothing idea may continue to be applied to causation
even if it is abandoned for the purposes of valuation. Whether the all-or-
nothing approach should continue for causation is another question. Only
a few observations on that question will be offered here.
There are some complex causation questions to which application of the
principles for valuing chance proposed in this article seem appealing.
Consider a plaintiff who had a pronounced preexisting risk of developing
epilepsy and who eventually develops the disease. Assume that prior to the
onset of the epilepsy, the plaintiff suffered a tortiously inflicted head in-
jury, unrelated to the preexisting condition, that creates an additional risk
of epilepsy. Assume also that when the epilepsy does in fact develop, it
appears that it probably would have done so precisely when it did even
absent the head injury, and that the head injury probably was not a sub-
stantial factor in producing it. The defendant did create a chance of epi-
lepsy, but we know that this probably was not the chance that material-
ized. The traditional rule would say that he therefore caused no loss since
the actual events demonstrated that there probably was no chance of
avoiding the epilepsy at the time of the second injury. If, under the sug-
gested approach, a judgment were rendered before the epilepsy material-
ized, the plaintiff would be compensated for the extent to which the tort,
by creating an additional chance of epilepsy, reduced the then-existing
chance of avoiding the disease. It may be sensible also to compensate for
the chance that it may not have been the preexisting risk that material-
ized, even if the judgment occurs after onset of the epilepsy, when we are
not absolutely certain what role was played by the tortious injury.
Or consider an accident victim who was probably dead on arrival at an
143. When a defect occurs that is common to all similar products throughout the industry, at least
one case has applied a modified chance-valuation analysis to the causation question. See Sindell v.
Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286
(1980) (discussed in note 116 supra).
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emergency room where he was negligently left untended. Conceptually,
one might reason under a strict causation analysis that there probably was
no chance of survival, and deny recovery. One can argue, however, that
the chance that the victim was still alive should be compensated by inte-
grating it (albeit by conjunction) into the computation of the value of the
chance that he could have been saved.
There may be other types of situations in which matters of causation
arguably should be handled under a probabilistic-percentage valuation,
rather than an all-or-nothing approach.1 44 Indeed, one may question the
general validity of the preponderance of the evidence rule and its all-or-
nothing concomitant, and ask whether it should be replaced generally by a
more sensitive mechanism such as the approach advocated in this article.
In any event, the proposals made here should be read as limited ones and
should be evaluated in the context of matters of valuation-the process of
determining the value of the destroyed loss. Extension or adaptation of
these ideas to fit other problems, such as true causation questions, must
await another occasion.
Conclusion
This essay has attempted to develop an analytical framework within
which to address problems of the loss of a chance in the contexts of preex-
isting conditions and future consequences. 141 It proposes that the all-or-
144. See, e.g., Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10
IND. L. REV. 797, 828-29 (1977); note 143 supra.
145. There are other situations involving loss of a chance in which the probability-valuation ap-
proach urged here is worth considering. In some situations, the plaintiff may allege that the defen-
dant's negligence failed to prevent the development of a dangerous situation. It may appear that there
was only a not-better-than-even chance that the injury would have been averted even with proper
preventive measures. Under the traditional view, it would be held that the defendant did not cause the
injury because it probably would have occurred anyway. Here again, it must be asked whether a more
rational result can be achieved by redefining the nature of the plaintiff's loss. Why not ask what the
lost chance of avoiding the ultimate injury was worth? Since the defendant's negligent omission as-
serted itself before the victim was placed in the position of jeopardy, we technically do not have a
preexisting condition situation. Nonetheless, the suggested approach to the loss of a chance could
prove useful in this context as well.
The suggested approach to the loss of a chance as a compensable interest may also have potential
application in tort litigation not involving personal injury. The legal malpractice case serves as a good
example. When a former client seeks to recover against a lawyer for legal malpractice that adversely
affected his prospects of success in a lawsuit, for example, many courts hold that it must be estab-
lished under the appropriate standard of proof that the plaintiff would otherwise have achieved a
better result but for his lawyer's malpractice. See R. MALLEN & V. LEViT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§
73, 326-370, 415-417 (1977); Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755,
769-71 (1959); Note, The Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Malpractice Cases, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 666, 667-72 (1978). Under this rule, failure to prove that the plaintiff's prospects for success in
the absence of negligence were better than even would ordinarily result in a denial of relief for the lost
litigation opportunity. It is more appropriate to award compensation for the loss of the chance of
success at trial. On the complex subject of the measure of damages in legal malpractice generally, see
R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra, §§ 131-151.
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nothing approach to the loss of a chance be abandoned for valuation pur-
poses. In its place a set of rules should be adopted that recognizes the
destruction of a chance, including a not-better-than-even chance, of some
more favorable outcome as a compensable loss worthy of redress, and that
appropriately value such losses to reflect their true nature.
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